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On February 22 to 24, 1984, a workshop was conducted at the NASA Langley Research Center on 
the CARE I11 (Computer-Aided Reliability Estimation) capability. A major feature of the workshop 
was the hands-on use of CARE I11 Version V by workshop attendees in the Langley Avionics 
Integration Research Lab (AIRLAB). Eight examples were designed to highlight the important 
CARE I11 features and to demonstrate the use of the CARE I11 user-friendly interface program 
CARE3MENU. These example problems were then published in NASA TM-85811, CARE 111 Hands- 
On Demonstration and Tutorial. 
Since February 1984, both CARE 111 and the CARE3MENU program have been modified and 
improved. CARE 111 Version VI enhancements are described by Bryant and Stiffler in NASA 
CR-177963, and the CARE3MENU modifications are described by Martensen in NASA CR-178251. 
This document reflects the use of CARE I11 Version VI and the modified CARESMENU and is an 
update of NASA TM-85811. In summary, the following changes to CARE I11 and the CARESMENU 
program are demonstrated in this document: 
CARE 111 
1. “Internal redundancy,” as described in NASA CR-177963, is illustrated in example problem 2. 
2. The new output format is shown in appendix A. 
Most CARE I11 changes were designed to decrease program execution time or to increase efficiency 
and are not directly demonstrated in this document. 
CARESMENU 
1. Previously created files may be edited, as shown in example problems 1, 2, and 4. 
2. A “review” capability is now available. Users may review all or part of the input file when 
entering data in order to correct past mistakes, verify previous inputs, or change the model. 
3. Partial files may be created during a session and finished in later sessions. 
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1. Introduction and Outline 
This tutorial is designed to illustrate the primary features of the CARE I11 and CARESMENU 
capabilities. Users of this tutorial should have a basic understanding of the CARE I11 program and 
the input data used to describe the system(s) of interest. (See refs. 1 and 2.) Mathematical details 
can be found in references 3 and 4. In particular, the following concepts should be well understood 
before using the CARESMENU program: 
1. The “behavioral decomposition” technique used with CARE I11 to separate the 
descriptions of fault arrivals and fault handling. 
2. The use of stages to describe system components, where stages are composed of one 
or more identical modules. With CARE I11 Version VI, modules may further be 
broken into submodules. 
3. The CARE I11 fault handling model (FHM) used to describe the system’s response to 
a fault arrival. Faults may be permanent, intermittent, or transient. 
4. The use of fault trees to describe system failure. 
5. The critical pair tree, which defines the faulty module pairs that are assumed to 
cause system failure because of improper fault handling. 
To avoid possible confusion between terms used in this and other documents, the following terms 
Fault-A condition which temporarily or permanently affects the ability of a module to perform 
Errol-A condition in which a module is incorrectly performing its function. 
Failure-Loss of system function. 
The first example problems are described in detail to familiarize the user with CARE3MENU and 
CARE I11 terminology. Subsequent problems contain less detail on the mechanisms of operating the 
CARE3MENU program and more on the reliability and design aspects. CARE3MENU details may 
be found in reference 5. The user is encouraged to exercise the example problems in the suggested 
order. Output listings are presented in appendix A, and a description of each CARE I11 input 
variable is included in appendix B. 
Three conversations are distinguished in the example problems. Boldface words or characters 
represent messages generated by the computer. Underlined words or characters are user inputs to 
be keyed-in. Other text that is neither boldface nor underscored is information from the instructor 
to guide the user. 
Each problem is divided into at least four parts: the problem description (which includes 
the functional block diagram of the system), the system failure criteria, the input data, and the 
system tree. As examples become more complex, additional information is given. Following this 
introductory information are instructions for using the user-friendly interface to input each of the 
example problems. 
The following is an outline to illustrate the flow of the tutorial: 
Building on the System Fault n e e  (Minimum Fault Handling Model) 
are defined and are used consistent with these definitions throughout the document: 
its function. 
Problem 1-Nonredundant system tree (exponential and Weibull fault occurrences) 
No functional redundancy 
No redundancy within the stages 
No coverage (default coverage) 
No internal redundancy 
Problem 2-Nonredundant system tree 
No functional redundancy 
Redundancy within the stages 
Internal redundancy within modules 
No coverage 
Problem 3-Redundant system tree 
Functional redundancy 
No redundancy within the stages 
No coverage 
No internal redundancy 
Building on the Fault Handling Model (Minimum System Dee Complexity) 
Problem 4-Nonredundant system tree 
Coverage: singlepoint failure 
Fault type: permanent (exponential and uniform) 
Coverage: singlepoint failure 
Problem 5-Redundant system tree 




Problem &Redundant system tree 
Coverage: singlepoint and critical pair failures 
Fault type (exponential only): permanent 
Critical pair failures within stages 
Spare units (NOP) 
Coverage: critical pair failures 
Problem 7-Redundant system tree 
Fault type (exponential only): permanent 
Critical pair failures within and across stages 
Spare units (NOP) 
Coverage: critical pair failures 
Problem 8-Redundant system tree 




Critical pair failures within a stage 
Double intermittent model introduced 
Spare units (NOP) 
2. Example Problem 1A Description 
This example illustrates the simplest of system fault occurrence models. There are three stages in 
the nonredundant system (fig. 2.1): sensor, computer, and actuator. The probability of system failure 
for mission times from 0 to 10 hours is to be predicted for exponential (component) failure rates X 
and then computed for Weibull (component) failure rates. This example ignores the fault handling 
capabilities of the system and therefore reduces the problem to a classic fault tree assessment. 
SENSOR * COMP ACT 
2 
Figure 2.1. Example problem 1A functional block diagram. 
2.1. System Failure Criteria 
The system failure criteria for example problem 1A are as follows: 
1. The system fails if any stage fails. 
2. A stage fails if a failure occurs in the stage. 
2.2. Input Data for the Fault Occurrence Model 
Sensor module: X = 1.5 x R = 1.0 (default)* R = l .lt  
Computer module: X = 4.8 x R = 1.0 (default)* R = 1.0 (default)t 
Actuator module: X = 3.7 x R = 1.0 (default)* R = l .lt  
*Problem 1A (exponential). 
t Problem 1B (Weibull). 
2.3. System Tree 
The system fault tree (fig. 2.2) describes the relationship between system failure and the loss of 
stages because of hardware depletion. 
Loss of system control 
because of 
exhaustion of hardware 
4 
stage sensor 
Figure 2.2. Example problem 1A system tree. (System fails if at least one stage fails.) 
2.4. Using the User-Friendly Interface 
Use of the user-friendly interface for example problem 1A is outlined in the following section. 
Preliminaries: 
the fault trees. 
1. For assistance or help, type “?” in lieu of a requested input at any time except when working 
2. Out-of-range values will not be accepted. (See User’s Guide, ref. 2.) 
3. The user can type in either uppercase or lowercase characters. 
4. In many cases, values are already supplied for the parameters. These are default values, and 
the user can elect to use these or may enter new values. The defaults are selected by pressing the 
return key. This paper indicates that default values are to be used with ‘‘a (default),” where 
stands for carriage return. 
Enter the CARE3MENU program by typing QCARE3MENU. The following screens will appear: 
3 
I CARE3MENU-Menu Based Data Input for CARE I11 
I-Input CARE I11 model 
A-Alter an existing model 
S-Store the current model 
E-Exit CARESMENU 
Enter Desired Function: I cr 
(Begin by selecting input.) 
Stage Description Input 
Stage Name: SENSOR cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 1 cr (default) 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 1 cr (default) 
Number of Beginning Submodules per Module: 0 cr (default) 
Minimum Number of Submodules for Module Operation: 0 g (default) 
Spare Submodules On-Line (T/F): T cr (default) 
Set(s) of Modules Subject to Critical Pair Failures: cr (default) 
Critical Fault Threshold: 0 cr (default) 
Number of Fault Handling Models Assigned to this Stage (opt.): 0 cr 
(Type Y to accept input and N to make corrections. Note that the number of fault handling 
models (FHM’s) assigned to  this stage is prespecified.) 
Verify Input (Y or N): X 
~ 
Stage Description Input 
Stage Name: COMPUTER cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 1 cr (default) 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 1 g (default) 
Number of Beginning Submodules per Module: 0 cr (default) 
Minimum Number of Submodules for Module Operation: 0 g (default) 
Spare Submodules On-Line (T/F): T cr (default) 
Set(s) of Modules Subject to Critical Pair Failures: cr (default) 
Critical Fault Threshold: 0 cr (default) 
Number of Fault Handling Models Assigned to this Stage (opt.): 0 
Verify Input (Y or N): 41 cr 
Stage Description Input 
Stage Name: ACTUATOR cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 1 cr (default) 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 1 cr (default) 
Number of Beginning Submodules per Module: 0 cr (default) 
Minimum Number of Submodules for Module Operation: 0 g (default) 
Spare Submodules On-Line (T/F): T cr (default) 
Set(s) of Modules Subject to Critical Pair Failures: cr (default) 
Critical Fault Threshold: 0 cr (default) 
Number of Fault Handling Models Assigned to this Stage (opt.): 0 cr 
Verify Input (Y or N): X cr 
4 
Stage Description Input 
Stage Name: END cr 
(All the stages have been input. Once END is typed and the return key pressed, the screen 
will disappear and the next screen will be displayed.) 
C-Continue to next screen 
T-Total Review of the model 
P-Partial Review of the model 
S-Store current model 
E-Exit CARE3MENU 
Enter Desired Function: C g 
(Continue to the Fault Handling Model Input.) 
For models where the user specifies 0 fault handling models assigned to each stage, the 
CARE3MENU program bypasses the entry of one or more FHM’s. It is assumed that the user 
is conducting a fault tree analysis with no consideration given to fault handling or critical near- 
coincident faults. 
A “dummy” FHM entitled “(NONE)” is created and included in the input file to satisfy the 
CARE I11 requirement that at least one fault handling model be assigned to each stage. This fault 
handling information is not used by the CARE I11 program. 
Fault Occurrence Models 
Stage: SENSOR FHM Number: 1 
Fault Type: (NONE) cr (default) 
FOM (Weibull/Exponential): EXPONENTIAL cr (default) 
Lambda = 1.5 E-5 cr (This is the rate at which the sensor fails.) 
Omega = 1.000000 (default) 
Fault Type Selection(s) 
(NONE) 
Verify Input (Y or N): 1 cr 
(Type 41 to accept input, N to make corrections.) 
(The number of FHM’s was prespecified for this stage.) 
***Specified No. of FHM’s Reached*** 
Note that fault arrivals are distributed exponentially and therefore Omega = 1. Omega # 1 
indicates a nonconstant (nonexponential) hazard rate. 
Fault Occurrence Models 
Stage: COMPUTER FHMNumber: 1 
Fault Type: NONE cr (default) 
FOM (Weibull/Exponential): EXPONENTIAL g (default) 
Lambda = 4.8 E-4 cr 
Omega = 1.000000 cr (default) 
Fault Type Selection ( 8 )  
(NONE) 
Verify Input (Y or N): g 
5 
Fault Occurrence Models 
Stage: ACTUATOR FHM Number: 1 
Fault Type: NONE= 
FOM (Weibull/Exponential): EXPONENTIAL g (default) 
Lambda = 3.7 E-5 cr 
Omega = 1.000000 (default) 
Fault Handling Model Names 
(NONE) 
Verify Input (Y or N): 41 g 
*** Specified No. of FHM’s Reached *** 
Stage 
Name 
Information Summary for Use in Checking 
System and Critical Pair Trees 
Stage No. of Modules No. of Submodules 










C-Continue to next screen 
T-Total Review of the model 
P-Partial Review of the model 
S-Store current model 
&Exit CARESMENU 
Enter Desired Function: C g 
(Continue with the tree entry.) 
(This information is used for labeling the system tree. The stage numbers are used to label 
the tree inputs. At this point the user would transfer these numbers to the system tree 
or verify that the tree is numbered correctly. Note that for this example the system tree has 
already been labeled.) 
Ready to Begin Failure Configuration Input 
(This screen warns the user that scrolling screens will be used, as opposed to menus. This means 
that corrections must be made before the g. If a mistake is made and g has been pressed, 
editing a previously typed line will not be possible until the Continue/Review/Store/Exit 
menu is reached. Answering N will allow the user to correct mistakes. Note that a 2 at this 
point will bring up the HELP screens, but once inside the scrolling screens, the user will not be 
allowed to access the help function.) 
Type any key to continue ... g 
Enter “?” for Menu Help 
System Fault Tree Input 
Enter System Fault Tree Label 
SYSTEM TREE EX 1 cr 
6 
1 
System Fault Tree Input 
Enter Input Event ID Range, Output Gate ID Range 
INPUT EVENT ID RANGE: 
OUTPUT GATE ID RANGE: 
1 3 
4 4 cr (Spaces should separate the numbers.) 
(Briefly, the first two numbers should be the range of inputs, where the inputs will be the stages 
entered by the user. The output gate ID range will indicate the range of outputs described by 
the tree. In this case, the ranges are 1 to 3 for the inputs and 4 to 4 for the outputs. The User’s 
Guide (ref. 2) provides more detail. Once cr is typed, the next screen will appear.) 
System Fault Tree Input 
Enter System Fault Tree Logic Block 
4 Q L 2 3 c r  
(The 4 is the OR gate output, the letter 0 is the symbol for the gate, and 1, 2, and 3 are inputs. 
Because the range of outputs was indicated above, CARE3MENU will automatically prompt 
with the output gate numbers.) 
’ The critical pair tree information is usually input at this point. However, because the user 
specified 0 FHM’s assigned to each stage, it is assumed that a standard fault tree analysis is to be 
performed and that no critical near-coincident fault information is required. 
Output Control Options Input 
Output Option (1-4): 1 cr (default) 
Coverage Functions Plot (T or F): F cr (default) 
Coverage Y-Axis Selection (Y-LInear, Y-Log, Both, Log-log): Y-LOG cr (def) 
Reliability Functions Plot (T or F): F cr (default) 
Reliability Y-Axis Selection (Y-LInear, Y-Log, Both, Log-log): Y-LOG 
Enter “?” for Menu Help 
(Normal screen editing is now restored.) 
Verify Input (Y or N): 
(def) 
g 
C-Continue to next screen 
T-Total Review of the model 
P-Partial Review of the model 
S-Store current model 
%Exit CARE3MENU 
Enter Desired Function: C g 
(Continue to the Runtime Control Options Input.) 
Runtime Control Options Input 
Mission Time: lo cr 
Integration Steps: LOGARITHMIC cr (default) 
Timebase (Hours, Minutes, Seconds, Days, Years): HOURS 
Cut Truncation Value = 0.1000000E09 a (default) 
QPTRNC Value = 0.1000000E01 cr (default) 
NPSBRN Value = 20 cr (default) 
CKDATA (T/F): T g (default) 
(default) 
7 
Enter "?" for Menu Help 
Verify Input (Y or N): x a 
***MODEL INPUT COMPLETE*** 
Do you wish to review or alter this model (Y/N)? E cr 
File Name Input 
Enter File Name for Model Storage: EX1A.DAT cr 
(The file is stored, and all variables are cleared. If, on the next menu, the user attempts to use 
S-Store the current model, an error message is displayed indicating that no file exists.) 
Verify Input (Y or N): x cr 
CARESMENU-Menu Based Data Input for CARE I11 
I-Input CARE I11 model 
A-Alter an existing model 
S-Store the current model 
E-Exit CARE3MENU 
Enter Desired Function: E cr 
(Exit the program.) 
FORTRAN STOP (CARESMENU has been exited.) 
Directions for executing the CARE I11 input file EX1A.DAT can be found in appendix C. 
2.5. Example Problem 1B Description 
To observe the effects of Weibull failure distributions on system reliability, reexecute the 
CARE3MENU program and ALTER the file just generated. When the Fault Occurrence Models 
screens are reached, choose the Weibull distribution in lieu of the exponential and give the R values 
listed below (as shown in section 2.2). The values were chosen to reflect increasing hazard rates for 
the mechanical sensor (e.g., rate gyros) and actuator components. 
Sensor module: x = 1.5 x 10-~ R = 1.1 
Actuator module: x = 3.7 x 1 0 - ~  R = 1.1 
Computer module: x = 4.8 x R = 1.0 (default) 
2.6. Comments 
The following comments can be made concerning example problems 1A and 1B: 
1. The proper selection of defaults can significantly reduce the input time. 
2. Weibull-exponential distributions can be used in any combination in any CARE I11 run. 
3. Example Problem 2A Description 
Problem 2A is another simple system (fig. 3.1). However, this system includes redundancy within 
the stages (Le., four computers instead of one). Mission time is still 10 hours and hazard rates are 
constant (exponential times to failure). As in example problem 1, fault handling is assumed to be 
perfect. 
a 






-o COMP o-o 
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Figure 3.1. Example problem 2A functional block diagram. 
3.1. System Failure Criteria 
The system failure criteria for example problem 2A are as follows: 
1. The system fails if any stage fails. 
2. The inertial reference sensor stage fails if two of three modules fail. 
3. The pitch rate stage fails if two of three modules fail. 
4. The computer stage fails if three of four modules fail. 
5. The secondary actuator stage fails if two of three modules fail. 
3.2. Input Data for the Fault Occurrence Model 
Inertial reference sensor modules: 
Pitch rate sensor modules: 
Computer modules: 
Secondary actuator modules: 
3.3. System Tree 
because of 
exhaustion of hardware 
x = 1.5 x 
x = 1.9 x 1 0 - ~  
x = 4.8 x 
x = 3.7 x 1 0 - ~  
1 2  
Figure 3.2. Example problem 2A system tree. 
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3.4. Using the User-Friendly Interface 
Prelamanar y: 
This problem uses slightly less CARESMENU detail than example problem 1. 
CARESMENU 
Enter Desired Function: I cr 
Stage Description Input 
Stage Name: INERTIAL REF cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 3 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 2 g 
Number of Beginning Submodules per Module: 0 cr (default) 
Minimum Number of Submodules for Module Operation: 0 cr (default) 
Spare Submodules On-Line (T/F): T 
Set(s) of Modules Subject to Critical Pair Failures: 
Critical Fault Threshold: cr (default) 
Number of Fault Handling Models Assigned to this Stage (opt.): Q g 
Stage Name: PITCH RATE cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 3 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 2 
Number of Beginning Submodules per Module: 0 g (default) 
Minimum Number of Submodules for Module Operation: 0 
Spare Submodules On-Line (T/F): T g (default) 
Set(s) of Modules Subject to Critical Pair Failures: cr (default) 
Critical Fault Threshold: cr (default) 
Number of Fault Handling Models Assigned to this Stage (opt.): Q 
Stage Name: COMPUTER cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 4 cr 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 2 g 
Number of Beginning Submodules per Module: 0 cr (default) 
Minimum Number of Submodules for Module Operation: 0 cr (default) 
Spare Submodules On-Line (T/F): T cr (default) 
Set(s) of Modules Subject to Critical Pair Failures: cr (default) 
Critical Fault Threshold: cr (default) 




Stage Name: SECONDARY ACT cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 3 g 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 2 cr 
Number of Beginning Submodules per Module: 0 g (default) 
Minimum Number of Submodules for Module Operation: 0 g (default 
Spare Submodules On-Line (T/F): T cr (default) 
Set(s) of Modules Subject to Critical Pair Failures: cr (default) 
Critical Fault Threshold: cr (default) 
Number of Fault Handling Models Assigned to this Stage (opt.): 0 
Stage Name: END cr 
10 
Enter Desired Function: C cr 
FHM information is not entered in this model. 
Fault Occurrence Models 
Stage: INERTIAL REF FHMNumber: 1 
Fault Type: (NONE) cr (default) 
FOM (Weibull/Exponential): EXPONENTIAL cr (default) 
Lambda = 1.5 E-5 cr 
Omega = 1.0 cr (default) 
Stage: PITCH RATE 
Fault Type: (NONE) cr (default) 
FOM (Weibull/Exponential): EXPONENTIAL (default) 
Lambda = 1.9 E 5  cr 
Omega = 1.0 cr (default) 
FHM Number: 1 
Stage: COMPUTER FHMNumber: 1 
Fault Type: (NONE) cr (default) 
FOM (Weibull/Exponential): EXPONENTIAL cr (default) 
Lambda = 4.8 E-4 cr 
Omega = 1.0 cr (default) 
Stage: SECONDARY ACT 
Fault Type: (NONE) cr (default) 
FOM (Weibull/Exponential): EXPONENTIAL cr (default) 
Lambda = 3.7 E 5  cr 
Omega = 1.0 cr (default) 
FHM Number: 1 
Information Summary for Use in Checking 
System and Critical Pair Trees 
Once again, this information is to be used for labeling the input events of the system fault tree 
(i.e., 1 to 4). The output or top event should be labeled 5 by the user. 
Enter Desired Function: C 
Ready to Begin Configuration Input 
Type any key to continue... cr 
System Fault Tree Input 
Enter System Fault Tree Label 
SYSTEM TREE EXS 2 cr 
Enter Input Event ID Range, Output Gate ID Range 
INPUT EVENT ID RANGE: 14 
OUTPUT GATE ID RANGE: 5 5 cr (Remember to use spaces to separate the numbers.) 
(In this problem, the range of inputs is 1 4 and the range of outputs is 5 5.) 
Enter System Fault Tree Logic Block 
501234cr 
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(The program accepts either the letter 0 or the number 0 to represent an OR gate.) 
(Critical pair tree information is not entered in this model.) 
I 
Output Control Options Input 
(Select the default values for each parameter.) 
1 Enter Desired Function: C cr 
Runtime Control Options Input 
Mission Time: 
Integration Steps: LOG cr (default) 
Timebase (Hours, Minutes, Seconds, Days, Years): HOURS cr (default) 
Cut Truncation Value = 0.1000000E-09 cr (default) 
QPTRNC Value = 0.1000000E01 cr (default) 
NPSBRN Value = 20 (default) 
CKDATA (T/F): T cr (default) 
***MODEL INPUT COMPLETE*** 
I Do you wish to review or alter this model (Y/N)? N g 
File Name Input 
Enter File Name for Model Storage: EX2A.DAT 
Verify Input (Y or N): g 
CARE3MENU-Menu Based Data Input for CARE I11 
Enter Desired Function: E cr 
(Exit the program.) 
FORTRAN STOP 
3.5. Example Problem 2B Description 
To illustrate the use of the module internal redundancy capability in CARE I11 Version VI, this 
example is presented. Each of the four redundant computers is composed of a central processor 
and memory. The processor controls memory access, effects configuration, and performs simple 
flight control tasks. The memory is composed of 4@bit lines supported by 4 redundant bit lines. A 
computer fails when either the central processor fails or less than 40 memory-bit lines are functioning 
correctly. The failure rate of each computer is A, = 4.8 x This failure rate represents the 
combined failure rates of the processor and memory-bit lines such that 
I where A, is the central processor failure rate of 2.4 x and Ambl is the memory-bit lines failure 
rate of 5.0 x 
To input example problem 2B, execute the CARE3MENU program and select 
A-Alter an existing model 
from the first menu screen. Then enter EX2A.DAT when asked for the file name. Use Alter in the 
COMPUTER stage to read 
Stage Description Input 
Stage Name: COMPUTER 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 4 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 2 
Number of Beginning Submodules per Module: 44 g 
Minimum Number of Submodules for Module Operation: 40 a 
Spare Submodules On-Line (T/F): T 
Set(s) of Modules Subject to Critical Pair Failures: g (default) 
Critical Fault Threshold: cr (default) 
Number of Fault Handling Models Assigned to this Stage (opt.): 
Additionally, the fault occurrence model (FOM) screen for the computer stage will need to be 
altered. The program automatically initiates the INPUT mode for the computer FOM screen. Input 
the data as follows: 
Fault Occurrence Models 
Stage: COMPUTER FHM Number: 1 
Fault Type: (NONE) g * Fault Type: (NONE) cr 
FOM (Weibull/Exponential): EXP cr * FOM (Weibull/Exponential: EXP g 
Lambda = 2.43-04 cr * Lambda = 5.OE06 cr 
Omega = 1.0 g (default) 
** MODULES ** * ** SUBMODULES ** 
* 
Fault Handling Models: (NONE) 
Omega = 1.0 a (default) 
Verify Input (Y or N): g 
All other information remains the same. Name the model EX2B.DAT and exit the CARE3MENU 
Another level of modeling detail is achieved by this model. For more information about the 
program. 
module internal redundancy capability in CARE 111 Version VI, see reference 6. 
4. Example Problem 3 Description 
Example problem 3 further expands the complexity of the previous systems by including 
functional redundancy. The stages, however, are composed of one module per stage and there 
is no redundancy within the stages. Hazard rates are constant and, as in the previous two examples, 
fault handling is assumed to be perfect. 
The functional block diagram of the entire system is shown in figure 4.1. Of particular interest in 
this example is the pitch augmented stability (PAS) function. This example computes the probability 












Figure 4.1. Example problem 3 functional block diagram. 
4.1. System Failure Criteria 
The PAS function fails if the computed data function fails or the elevator actuation function 
fails. The following lists ways these two functions may fail: 
1. The computed data function fails if three of four sensor sets fail, or if the computation fails. 
A. A sensor set fails when 
a. computer A or inertial reference sensor A fails. 
b. computer B or inertial reference sensor B fails. 
c .  computer C or inertial reference sensor C fails. 
d. computer D or the pitch rate sensor fails. 
B. The computation function fails if three of four computers fail. 
2. The elevator actuator function, composed of four elements, fails when three of the four elements 
fail. The four elements are the actuator function (elevator math model'), and three secondary 
actuators. 
A. Secondary actuator A fails if computer A or actuator electronics A fails. 
B. Secondary actuator B fails if computer B or actuator electronics B fails. 
C. Secondary actuator C fails if computer C or actuator electronics C fails. 
D. The elevator math model fails if three of the four computers fail. 
The computers perform both the computation function and the elevator math model computations. 
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4.2. Input Data for the Fault Occurrence Model 
Computer (C) modules: XA = 4.4 x 1 0 - ~  
AB = 4.8 x 
AD = 3.1 x 1 0 - ~  
XA = 1.7 x 
AB = 1.5 x 
xc = 3.5 x 1 0 - ~  
Inertial reference sensor (IRS) modules: 
xc = 2.1 x 1 0 - ~  
x = 1.8 x 
xc = 3.7 x 
Pitch rate sensor (PRS) modules: 
Actuator electronics (AE) modules: XA = 3.6 x 
AB = 3.1 x 10-5 
4.3. System Tree 
Loss of system control 
because d 










I I I 1 
Secondary Secondw Secondary Elevator 
actuator A actuator B actuator C 
l B 3 @  
1 9  2 1 0  3 1 1  
2 4 
COMP: Computer 
IRS: Inedial reference sensor 
AE: Actuator electronics 
PRS: , Pitch rate sensor 
Figure 4.2. Example problem 3 system tree. 
The computation function and elevator math model both fail when three of the four computers 
fail. From the tree in figure 4.2 it is evident that if the computation function fails, then the computed 
data branch fails and PAS function loss occurs. The inclusion of the elevator math model, therefore, 
is redundant and will not impact this system’s probability of failure. However, it is included in the 
tree for the sake of clarity and completeness. The user may wish to remove the elevator math model 
from the tree and change the elevator actuators 3/4 gate to a 2/3 gate to verify that CARE I11 
produces the same results. 
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4.4. Using the User-Friendly Interface 
The level of CARESMENU screen detail has been reduced. 
Pre limanar y : 
CARE3MENU-Menu Based Data Input for CARE I11 
Enter Desired Function: I cr 
Stage Description Input 
Stage Name: COMPUTER A cr 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: COMPUTER B cr 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: COMPUTER C cr 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: COMPUTER D g 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: INERTIAL SENSOR A cr 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: INERTIAL SENSOR B cr
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: INERTIAL SENSOR C cr 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: PITCH RATE cr 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: ACT ELECTRONICS A 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: ACT ELECTRONICS B cr 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: ACT ELECTRONICS C cr 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHMs, and verify.) 
Stage Name: END cr 
Enter Desired Function: C cr 
No FHM information is entered in this model. Once again, if the screen appears (indicating that 
the user did not specify 0 FHMs for all stages), enter PERMANENT as the fault type and select 
all defaults. Type END when the second screen appears. At least one Fault Occurrence Models 
screen will require the fault type to be specified. If the program then queries for more than one fault 
type for that stage, the user should type END to continue to the next stage. 
Fault Occurrence Models 
(For all the fault occurrence models below, select the defaults for the fault type, FOM (exponential 
default), and for omega (default = 1.0). The only value to be input is lambda.) 
Stage: COMPUTER A 
Lambda = 4.4 E-4 cr 
(Verify) 
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Stage: COMPUTER B 
Lambda = 4.8 E 4  cr 
(Verify) 
Stage: COMPUTER C 
Lambda = 3.5 E-4 cr 
(Verify) 
Stage: COMPUTER D 
Lambda = 3.1 E-4 cr 
(Verify) 
Stage: INERTIAL SENSOR A 
Lambda = 1.7 E-5 cr 
(Verify) 
Stage: INERTIAL SENSOR B 
Lambda = 1.5 E 5  cr 
(Verify) 
Stage: INERTIAL SENSOR C 
Lambda = 2.1 E-5 cr 
(Verify) 
Stage: PITCH RATE 
Lambda = 1.8 E-5 cr 
(Verify) 
Stage: ACT ELECTRONICS A 
Lambda = 3.6 E-5 cr 
(Verify) 
Stage: ACT ELECTRONICS B 
Lambda = 3.1 E-5 cr 
(Verify) 
Stage: ACT ELECTRONICS C 
Lambda = 3.7 E-5 cr 
(Verify) 
Information Summary for Use in Checking 
System and Critical Pair Trees 
(Continue by typing C cr.) 
~ 
Ready to Begin Failure Configuration Input 
Type any key to continue ... 
System Fault Tree Input 
Enter System Tree Label 
SYSTEM TREE EX 3 
Input Event ID Range: 1 11 
Output Gate ID Range: 12 24 
Enter System Fault Tree Logic Block 
12Q15cr 




16 3 12 13 14 15 cr 
17312 34cr 




22 0 16 17 cr 
23 3 18 19 20 21 cr 
24 0 22 23 cr 
(Two different logic gates are used in this example problem. The first gate is an OR gate and 
has been used in the past two examples. The second type of gate is the M / N  (“M out of N ” )  
gate. For example, note that the fifth line reads 16 3 12 13 14 15 cr. The first number is the 
gate output number. Following that is the gate type, in this case a 3/N gate. The number of 
gate inputs following the gate type is equal to N .  By counting the inputs on this line, the user 
can easily see that this is a 3/4 gate, with inputs numbered 12 to 15.) 
No critical pair tree is entered in this model. If the Critical Pairs Fault Tree Input Screen 
appears, type END cr for the fault tree label. 
Output Control Options Input 
I (Select defaults and verify.) 
Runtime Control Options Input 
Mission Time: cr 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
***MODEL INPUT COMPLETE*** 
Do you wish to review or alter this model (Y/N)? E 
File Name Input 
Enter File Name for Model Storage: EX3.DAT cr 
Verify Input (Y or N): Y 
I 
I 
CARESMENU-Menu Based Data Input for CARE I11 
Enter Desired Function: E g 
(Exit the program.) 
FORTRAN STOP 
I 4.5. Comments 
For these first three example problems, the fault type (NONE) has been assigned to each of the 
stages. CARE3MENU has automatically generated one fault handling model and stored the FHM 
data in the CARE I11 input file. Because the FHM singlepoint failure parameter C equals 1.0 and 
because there are no critical pair trees (and therefore the CARE I11 “QSUM” probability equals 
zero), the problem is reduced to a classic fault tree problem and is solved as such. 
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5. Example Problem 4A Description 
Example problem 4A introduces the fault handling model for permanent faults only. The system 
structure is identical to that of example problem 2A (see fig. 5.1). However, in example problem 2A 
the system can fail only if hardware redundancy requirements are not met. In addition to failure 
by lack of hardware, this example allows the possibility of system failure because of a singlepoint 
failure in the computer stage. Other stages are assumed to have perfect coverage. 
The computer stage checks for computer faults by majority voting on all outputs to the actuator 
stage. If a failed computer is successfully detected, it is isolated from the system by the remaining 
good units. This process continues until a majority vote cannot be accomplished, that is, when less 
than two computers survive. At this point the system fails because the system contains no functional 
redundancy. (See system tree.) 
The singlefault model is shown in section 5.4 and includes four parameters not yet used in the 
example problems. The computers detect faults by executing periodic or random self-test programs. 
The fault detection rate is given by 6(t ') .  The rate at which errors are generated from the permanent 
faults is given by p(t ' ) ,  and the rate of error detection is given by ~(7). The failure parameter C is 









I -o COMP +-o I 
SEC ACT-- '  
PITCH 
RATE COMP 
Figure 5.1. Example problem 4A functional block diagram. 
5.1. System Failure Criteria 
The system failure criteria for example problem 4A are as follows: 
1. The system fails if any stage fails. 
2. A singlepoint failure in the computer stage causes system failure. 
3. The inertial reference sensor stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
4. The pitch rate stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
5. The computer stage fails if three out of four modules fail. 
6. The secondary actuator stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
VOTING 
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5.2. Input Data 
For the Fault Occurrence Model: 
Inertial reference sensor modules: 
Pitch rate sensor modules: 
Computer modules: 
Secondary actuator modules: 
x = 1.5 x 
x = 1.9 x 10-5 
x = 4.8 x 1 0 - ~  
x = 3.7 x 10-~  
For the Permanent Fault Handling Model: 
Self-test rate: 6(t’) = 360 detections per hour 
Random test (problem 4A): Exponential 
Periodic test (problem 4B): Uniform 
Random test (problem 4A): Exponential 
Periodic test (problem 4B): Uniform 
Random test (problem 4A): Exponential 
Periodic test (problem 4B): Uniform 
Error generation rate: p(t’)  = 180 errors per hour 
Error detection rate: ~ ( 7 )  = 3600 detections per hour 
Error recovery probability: C = 0.999 
Problem 4A uses the exponential distribution (default) to descriGe the parameters 6(t’), p(t’), and ~(7). 
To see the effects of solving the problem using uniform distributions, problem 4B should be executed. 
5.3. System Tree 
Loss of system control 
because of 
exhaustion of hardware 
I 
I 1  I 2  1 3  1 4  
Figure 5.2. Example problem 4A system tree. 
5.4. Single-Fault Model 
The transition from the A state to the AD state represents the detection of a fault before the 
fault generates errors, and the transition from A to AE represents an active fault that generates 
errors. With the rate ~ ( 7 )  and probability C ,  the system recovers to the AD state; with rate ~ ( 7 )  
and probability (1 - C), a single-point failure causes system failure ( F  state). 
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i 
Error recovery probability Fault detection rate, 6(t’) 
(t) 
System failure state 
because of a single 
point failure 
Error generation rate 
Figure 5.3. Example problem 4A permanent single-fault model. 
5.5. Using the User-Friendly Interface 
CARESMENU-Menu Based Data Input for CARE I11 
Enter Desired Function: I cr 
Stage Description Input 
Stage Name: INERTIAL REF cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 3 cr 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 2 cr 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHM’s, and verify.) 
Stage Name: PITCH RATE cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 3 E 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 2 g 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHM’s, and verify.) 
Stage Name: COMPUTER cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 4 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 2 cr 
(Select defaults, specify 1 FHM, and verify.) 
Stage Name: SECONDARY ACT cr 
Number of Beginning Modules in Stage: 3 cr 
Minimum Number of Modules for Stage Operation: 2 cr 
(Select defaults, specify 0 FHM’s, and verify.) 
Stage Name: END cr 
(Continue to the next screen.) 
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Fault Handling Models 
(The fault type selections in this example are “PERMANENT” and “(NONE).” See section 5.6 
for additional information about these FHM’s and the CARE I11 input file.) 
Fault Type: PERMANENT cr 
Alpha = 0.0 cr (default) 
Beta = 0.0 cr (default) 
Delta = 360 cr 
Rho = 180 cr 
Epsilon = 3600 cr (default) 
Pa = 1.000000 cr (default) 
Pb = 0.0 cr (default) 
C = .999 cr (default) 
(Exponential) 
(Exponential) 
Delta FHM: EXPONENTIAL cr (default) 
Rho FHM: EXPONENTIAL cr (default) 
Epsilon FHM: EXPONENTIAL cr 
I Fault Type: END cr 
(Continue to the next screen.) 
Fault Occurrence Model 
Stage: INERTIAL REF 
Fault Type: (NONE) cr (default) 
Lambda = 1.5 E5 cr 
(Select the appropriate defaults and verify.) 
Stage: PITCH RATE 
Fault Type: (NONE) cr (default) 
Lambda = 1.9 E 5  cr 
(Select the appropriate defaults and verify.) 
Stage: COMPUTER 
Fault Type: PERMANENT cr 
Lambda = 4.8 E 4  cr 
(Select the appropriate defaults and verify.) 
Stage: SECONDARY ACT 
Fault Type: (NONE) cr (default) 
Lambda = 3.7 E5 cr 
(Select the appropriate defaults and verify.) 
FHM Number: 1 
FHM Number: 1 
FHM Number: 1 
FHMNumber: 1 
Verify the information summary against the system tree and continue to the tree entry. 
System Fault Tree Input 
Enter System Tree Label 
SYSTEM TREE EX 4A 
Input Event ID Range: 1 4 
Output Gate ID Range: 5 5 cr 
Enter System Fault Tree Logic Block 
5 Q 12 3 4 cr 
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Critical Pairs Fault Tree Input 
-- END cr 
(No critical pair tree for this model.) 
(Continue to the next screen.) 
Output Control Options Input 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
(Continue to the next screen.) 
Runtime Control Options Input 
Mission Time: lo cr 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
***MODEL INPUT COMPLETE*** 
Do you wish to review or alter this model (Y/N)? N 
(Store the file as EX4A.DAT and exit the program.) 
FORTRAN STOP 
5.6. Example Problem 4B Description 
The effects of the uniform distribution for the parameters 6(t’), p(t’) ,  and E ( T )  can be observed 
by altering the file EX4A.DAT and executing the CARE I11 program. When the Fault Handling 
Models screen for the PERMANENT fault type is reached, ALTER the screen and change the 
Delta FHM, Rho FHM, and Epsilon FHM from EXPONENTIAL to UNIFORM. 
Fault Handling Models 
Fault Type: PERMANENT cr 
Alpha = 0.0 cr (Exponential) 
Beta = 0.0 cr (Exponential) 
Delta = 360 cr 
Rho = 180 cr 
Epsilon = 3600 cr 
Pa = 1.000000 cr 
Pb = 0.0 cr 
c = .999cr 
Delta FHM: UNIFORM cr 
Rho FHM: UNIFORM cr 
Epsilon FHM: UNIFORM cr 
~ 
Continue to review the file until the Fault Handling Model Accuracy screen is reached. This 
screen only appears when the user selects at least one UNIFORM distribution for the fault handling 
function. Select the defaults for the screen as shown below. 
Fault Handling Model Accuracy 
DBLDF (Doubling Step Difference) = 0.5000000E01 cr (default) 
TRUNC (Coverage Function Truncation) = 0.1000000E-03 cr (default) 
23 
The two parameters DBLDF and TRUNC control the accuracy of the CARE I11 algorithm. For 
Continue to review the model. Name this model EX4B.DAT and exit the program. 
5.7. Comments 
When the iser indicates 0 FHM’s to be assigned to a stage, the CARE3MENU program creates 
an FHM entitled “(NONE).” The user then may enter only four additional FHM’s to bring the total 
FHM’s for the model to five zfa (NONE) FHM is desired. It is important to note that the user 
may indicate 0 FHM’s for one or more stages, but if five FHM’s are entered, the (NONE) FHM is 
automatically overwritten by the fifth FHM. 
The names chosen to describe the stages and FHM’s are intended to be descriptive. However, 
the CARE3MENU program simply verifies that no other stage or FHM has the same name and then 
stores the name as a character string. No intuitive interpretation of the name is made. Thus, the 
FHM name “PERMANENT” in this model could have been shortened to “PERM,” or shortened 
simply to “P,” or given any other (unique) string value. The stage and FHM names (written into the 
STGNAMES and FHMNAMES NAMELIST paragraphs, respectively) are included in the CARE I11 
input file and are used if the file is later altered by a CARESMENU session. The STGNAMES and 
FHMNAMES NAMELIST paragraphs are disregarded by the CARE I11 program. 
more information, see reference 2. 
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6. Example Problem 5 Description 
Example problem 5 (fig. 6.1) expands on example problem 4 by the addition of redundancy in 
the system tree and a more detailed single-fault model. The redundant system tree now includes a 
backup to the digital computer stage. The backup is a bare-bones, limp-back analog system that is 
switched in when the digital computer stage fails. 
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Figure 6.1. Example problem 5 functional block diagram. 
The single-fault model in section 6.4 is further expanded to include, for the computer stage only, 
the consideration of transients and intermittents in addition to the previously defined permanent 
fault model. All other factors, such as mission length and hazard distributions, are unchanged. 
The inclusion of transients and intermittents allows the user to include another level of modeling 
sophistication that considers systems architectures which can differentiate between permanent, 
transient, and intermittent module failures. Proper identification of the failure type causes a different 
system response for purging failed modules. The addition of two probabilities, PA and PB, enables 
that capability. 
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The parameter PA is the probability that a module with a nonbenign fault must be retired from 
service, and therefore 1 - PA is the probability that the module is to be returned to service following 
the detection of the fault. The assignment of 0 < PA < 1 enables the modeling of transients which 
do not cause a module to be purged, thus allowing the transient to vanish. The risk of not purging 
a faulty module (for example, a module with an intermittent or permanent fault) is weighed against 
the risk of purging a module with a short-lived transient. The probability PB has a similar meaning 
except the risk involves benign faults as opposed to active faults. 
6.1. System Failure Criteria 
The system failure criteria for example problem 5 are as follows: 
1. The system fails if the inertial reference sensor, pitch rate sensor, or actuator stage fails, or if 
the digital computer stage fails and the analog computer or transfer switch fails. 
2. A singlepoint failure in the computer stage causes system failure. 
3. The inertial reference sensor stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
4. The pitch rate stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
5.  The computer stage fails if three out of four modules fail. 
6. The secondary actuator stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
6.2. Input Data 
For the Fault Occurrence Model: 
Inertial reference sensor modules: 
Pitch rate sensor modules: 
Digital computer modules (permanent): 
Digital computer modules (transient): 
Digital computer modules (intermittent): 
Transfer switch module: 
Analog computer module: 
Secondary actuator modules: 
For the Single-Fault Handling Model: 
Self-test rate: 6(t’) = 360 detections per hour 
Error detection rate: E ( T )  = 3600 detections per hour 
Error generation rate: p(t’) = 180 errors per hour 
Error recovery probability: C = 0.999 
Transient duration rate a: 3.6 x lo4 
Intermittent duration rate a: 2.1 x lo3 
Intermittent benign-teactive rate p: 3.0 x lo3 
Retire module (active fault) probability PA: 0.9 
Retire module (benign fault) probability PB: 0.1 
Random test: Exponential 
Random test: Exponential 
Random pattern: Exponential 
x = 1.5 x 10-5 
x = 1.9 x 10-5 
x = 4.8 x 10-4 
x = 7.2 x 10-3 
x = 3.3 x 10-~  
x = 2.3 x 10-9 
x = 3.7 x 10-5 
A = 1.7 x 
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6.3. System Tree 






Figure 6.2. Example problem 5 system tree. 
6.4. Single-Fault Model 
The general single-fault model (fig. 6.3) includes all the CARE I11 FHM parameters. In 
example problem 5, four fault types are described: (NONE), PERMANENT, TRANSIENT, and 
INTERMITTENT. When a and p equal zero, the general singlefault model reduces to a permanent 
singlefault model, as shown in figure 5.3. Likewise, a model with a > 0 and p = 0 represents 
a transient singlefault model. The intermittent single-fault model has a > 0 and p > 0. The 
“(NONE)” FHM has one transition in the model, from the A to AD state. All other transitions are 
disabled by setting p(t’)  = a = 0 and PA = 1.0. The B, BD, and BE states represent, respectively, 
a benign fault, a detected benign fault, and a fault that has produced errors before it becomes 
benign. 
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{ =\, ...................... - 
Faulty module is ; 
permanently isolated I 












--- Indicates instantaneous transition 
Minimum Beginning Number of 
modules submodules FHM’s 
- 2 0 0 
- 2 0 0 
- 2 0 - 3 
1 0 - 0
1 0 - 0
- 2 0 0 
Figure 6.3. Example problem 5 general single-fault model. 

















0 - 0 
Stage Description Input 
Enter the CARE3MENU as in the previous examples. Enter the stage names, the number of 
beginning modules, and the minimum number of modules for stage operation as in example 









Fault Handling Models 



























































Alpha and beta will always be exponentially distributed, while delta, rho, and epsilon distribu- 
tions can be described by either the exponential or the uniform distribution. For more information 
about these fault types, see reference 2. 
Fault Occurrence Models 
For each stage enter the appropriate fault type(s) and lambda value(s). Select the defaults for 


















1.5 E 5  
1.9 E 5  
4.8 E 4  
7.2 E 3  
3.3 E 4  
1.7 E 1 0  
2.3 E 9  
3.7 E 5  
~ 
Verify the information summary against the system tree and continue to the tree entry. 
System Fault Tree Input 
Enter System Tree Label 
SYSTEM TREE EX 5 
I 28 
Input Event ID Range: 1 6 
Output Gate ID Range: 2 9 cr 
Enter System Fault Tree Logic Block 
7 0 4 5 c r  
8 A 3 7 c r  
9 0 1 2 8 6 c r  
(The A represents an AND gate.) 
Critical Pairs Fault Tree Input 
Enter Fault Tree Label 
-- END cr 
Output Control Options Input 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
Runtime Control Options Input 
Mission Time: 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
***MODEL INPUT COMPLETE*** 
Do you wish to review or alter this model (Y/N)? & 
(Store the file with the name EX5.DAT and exit the program.) 
FORTRAN STOP 
7. Example Problem 6 Description 
Example problem 6 (fig. 7.1) introduces two more CARE I11 capabilities. The first is the modeling 
of critical pair failures within stages, and the second is the modeling of hot spares. In this example, 
a critical pair failure is defined for the digital computer stage only. This problem allows for both 
singlepoint failures and critically coupled faults which result in system failure. 
To illustrate the critically coupled fault model, the digital computer stage is configured as a 
triplex with one hot spare in lieu of the quadraplex system used in example problem 4. The triplex 
computers randomly execute a self-test program to detect faults, and the hot spare is constantly 
being flexed by randomly replacing a triad module with the spare. The replaced module then 
becomes the hot spare. A critically coupled failure is assumed to occur if two undetected faults 








1-4 SEC ACT1 PITCH 
COMP -













I RATE. t-l I 
Figure 7.1. Example problem 6 functional block diagram. 
7.1. System Failure Criteria 
The system failure criteria for example problem 6 are as follows: 
1. The system fails if any stage fails. 
2. A singlepoint failure in the computer stage causes system failure. 
3. The system fails if a critically coupled failure occurs in the computer stage. 
4. The inertial reference sensor stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
5. The pitch rate sensor stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
6. The computer stage fails if three out of four modules fail. 
7. The secondary actuator stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
7.2. Input Data 
For the Fault Occurrence Model: 
Inertial reference sensor modules: 
Pitch rate sensor modules: 
Computer modules: 
Secondary actuator modules: 
x = 1.5 x 10-5 
x = 1.9 x 1 0 - ~  
x = 4.8 x 
x = 3.7 x 10-~ 
~ 
For the Single-Fault Handling Model: 
Self-test rate: 6(t’) = 360 detections per hour 
Error detection rate: ~ ( 7 )  = 3600 detections per hour 
Random test: Exponential 
Random test: Exponential 
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Error generation rate: p(t ' )  = 180 errors per hour 
Error recovery probability: C = 0.999 
Random pattern: Exponential 
7.3. System Tree 
because of 
exhaustion of hardware 
h 
I 
Figure 7.2. Example problem 6 system tree. 
7.4. Single-Fault Model 
Fault detection rate, 6(t') 
Error detection rate 
System failure state 
because of a single 
point failure 
(t) 
Error generation rate 
Figure 7.3. Example problem 6 permanent single-fault model. 
7.5. Critical Pair Tree 
A critical pair tree (fig. 7.4) identifies the modules within the system that are critically coupled. 
In this example, computers 1 to 3 are initially operational and subject to the critical pair failure 
criterion. Computer 4 is treated as a hot spare which simply vanishes if it fails as a spare. When an 
undetected fault or error exists in a member of the voting trio and another member of the trio also 
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becomes faulty, the system is assumed to fail because of the presence of two simultaneously faulty 
modules in the voting triad. 
The line Set(s) of Modules Subject to Critical Pair Failures for the computer stage 
indicates that the fourth computer (or module) is a spare and therefore does not critically couple 
with the other computers. Equivalently, therefore, the 2/3 gate could have been a 2/4 gate, with 
computer 4 included as an input. In CARE 111, the line Set(s) of Modules ... (the CARE I11 input 
file “NOP” parameter) overrides the critical pair gate specification. 
If a single member of the voting trio fails and fault handling is successful, the spare, if it is 
still operational, replaces the failed voting member. A second failure leaves two remaining in-use 
computers which are still subject to a critical pair failure. The next failure, resulting in one in-use 
computer remaining, causes the computer stage to fail since the success criterion of two out of four is 
not met for stage survival. In this example, loss of the computer stage causes system failure because 
there is no functional redundancy in the system tree. 
Beginning Minimum Beginning 
Stage name modules modules submodules 
INERTIAL REF - 3 - 2 0 
PITCH RATE - 3 - 2 0 
COMPUTER - 4 - 2 0 
SECONDARY ACT - 3 - 2 0 
Loss of system control 
because of 
critical couples 




- 3 - 1
- 0
Figure 7.4. Example problem 6 critical pair tree. 
7.6. Using the User-Friendly Interface 
Preliminary: 
For this example, the critical pair tree input screens are shown with detail. 
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Fault Handling Models 
Enter the fault type used in this problem as listed below. 
Fault type Parameter Value 
PERMANENT Delta = - 360 
Rho = 180 
Epsilon = 3600 





Fault Occurrence Models 
For all the fault occurrence models below, select the defaults for the FOM (exponential default) 
and for omega (default = 1.0). The only values to be input are fault type and lambda. 
Stage Fault type 
INERTIAL REF (NONE) 
PITCH RATE (NONE) 
COMPUTER PERMANENT 
SECONDARY ACT (NONE) 
Lambda 
1.5 E 5  
1.9 E 5  
4.8 E 4  
3.7 E 5  
Verify the information summary against the system tree and continue to tree entry. 
System Fault Tree Input 
Enter System Tree Label 
SYSTEM TREE EX 6 cr 
Input Event ID Range: 1 4 
Output Gate ID Range: 5 5 cr 
Enter System Fault Tree Logic Block 
5 0 1 2  3 4 cr 
Critical Pairs Fault Tree Input 
Enter Fault Tree Label 
CRITICAL PAIRS TREE EX 6 cr 
Enter Module and Logic Range ID 
1 4 5 5 c r  
(This input describes the input range and output range. It is conceptually the same as the system 
tree lines Input Event ID Range and Output Gate ID Range.) 
Enter Module Unit to Stage Association 
- 3 1 4 c r  
-- END cr 
(This input indicates that inputs numbered 1 to 4 are the modules belonging to stage 3. Though 
all modules are not used in the tree, all four must be included in the line.) 
Enter Logic Gate ID 
5 2 1 2 3 c r  
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(Because the user indicated the range of outputs in the line above, the computer prompts for 
each output line by line. The first number or letter input by the user should be the gate type, 
where the allowable gates are the OR (0), two-input AND (A), or 2/N (2) gates. The critical 
pair tree should never be constructed so that one or more than two module failures cause an 
output from the topmost gate. Therefore, the AND gate is restricted to two inputs, and the 
M/N gate is reduced to the more restrictive 2/N gate. Finally, all inputs to the gate follow the 
gate type specification. In this example, the 2/N gate has three inputs, numbered 1, 2, and 3.) 
Enter Fault Tree Label 
-- END cr (There are no more critical pair trees to be input.) 
Output Control Options Input 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
Runtime Control Options Input 
Mission Time: cr 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
***MODEL INPUT COMPLETE*** 
Do you wish to review or alter this model (Y/N)? N cr 
(Store the file as EX6.DAT and exit the CARESMENU program.) 
FORTRAN STOP 
8. Example Problem 7 Description 
Example problem 7 (fig. 8.1) expands the analysis of the system in example problem 6 to study 
the effects of critical pair failures across stages as well as within a stage. To illustrate critical pair 
failures across stages, another stage is included in this analysis and added to the problem description 
of example problem 6. The new stage is the computer (C) bus, which enables communication between 
computers. The C-bus stage is composed of four buses; the failure of three or more buses causes 
the system to fail. Each bus transmits data from one computer to the remaining three computers. 
The computers pass results via the buses and vote the information before transmitting signals to 
the actuators. 
One bus, which initially transmits data from the spare computer, is a hot spare and is not subject 
to critical pair failures. The three in-use buses, however, are susceptible to critical pair failures. Once 
an error is detected, a test is executed to indicate whether the fault is in the bus or the computer. 
The appropriate module is then isolated from the system. Note that a fault in one of the triad 
computers and a fault in one of the two triad buses which is not connected to the faulted computer 
precludes a correct majority vote at the receiving end of the triplex bus. This cross coupling of 
failures in two different stages (i.e., computer and bus) is a critically coupled failure across stages. 
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1 - 1 -  
- 1  I I IRS 
I RATE H I -
PITCH L q  
COMP BUS PITCH 
RATE 
-m 
Figure 8.1. Example problem 7 functional block diagram. 
8.1. System Failure Criteria 
The system failure criteria for example problem 7 are as follows: 
1. The system fails if any stage fails. 
2. A single-point failure in the computer stage causes system failure. 
3. The system fails if a critically coupled failure occurs in the computer stage, in the 
4. The inertial reference sensor stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
5.  The computer stage fails if three out of four modules fail. 
6. The bus stage fails if three out of four modules fail. 
bus stage, or across these stages. 
8.2. Input Data 
For the Fault Occurrence Model: 
Inertial reference sensor modules: 
Pitch rate sensor modules: 
Computer modules: 
Secondary actuator modules: 
x = 1.5 x 10-~ 
x = 1.9 x 10-5 
x = 4.8 x 
x = 3.7 x 
Computer buses: A = 2.7 x 
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For the Single-Fault Handling Model: 
Self-test rate: 
Computer stage: 6(t’) = 360 detections per hour 
Computer bus stage: 6(t‘) = 1.0 x lo4 detections per hour 
Computer stage: p(t’) = 180 errors per hour 
Computer bus stage: p(t’) = 0 errors per hour 
Computer stage: E ( T )  = 3600 detections per hour 
Computer bus stage: E ( T )  = 0 detections per hour 
Error generation rate: 
Error detection rate: 
Error recovery probability: 
Computer stage: C = 0.999 
Computer bus stage: C = 1.0 
I 8.3. System Tree 
I 
Loss of system control 
because of 
exhaustion of hardware 
8.4. 
Figure 8.2. Example problem 7 system tree. 
Single-Fault Model 
Error recovery probability 
Fault detection rate, 6(t’) 
4t)  
System failure state 
because of a single- 
point failure 
/ 
Error generation rate 
Figure 8.3. Example problem 7 permanent singlefault model. 
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8.5. Critical Pair Tree 
The 2/3 gate with output 15 models the computer stage critically coupled failure. (See fig. 8.4.) 
The 2/3 gate with output 16 models the C-bus stage critically coupled failure. Once again, a 2/4 
gate would have produced equivalent results. (See the discussion in section 7.5.) The OR gate (with 
output 17) and all lower connecting gates model critical couples across the computer and C-bus 
stages. For example’, if computers 2 or 3 become faulty and C-bus 5 becomes faulty, the buses have 
bad data on two of the three in-use buses even though only one bus has failed. This critical couple 
causes the system to fail. Outputs 13 and 14 and lower level gates take into account the other 
combinations of computer and C-bus faults. 
because of 
Figure 8.4. Example problem 7 critical pair tree. 
8.6. Using the User-Friendly Interface 
Use of the user-friendly interface for example problem 7 is outlined in the following section. 
It is recommended that the user understand the critical pair tree used in this example before 
continuing to the Critical Pairs Fault Tree Input. 
Preliminary: 
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Stage Description Input 
Enter the CARESMENU program as in the previous examples. The input values are listed below. 
Beginning Minimum Beginning Set(s) of Number of . 
Stage name modules modules submodules modules FHM’s 
INERTIAL REF - 3 - 2 0 - 0
PITCH RATE - 3 - 2 0 0 
2 0 - 3 - 1COMPUTER - 4 -
SECONDARY ACT - 3 - 2 0 - 0
2 0 - 3 - 1COMPUTER BUS - 4 -
Fault type Parameter Value 
PERMANENT C Delta = - 360 
Rho = - 180 
Epsilon = 3600 
C =  .999 
Rho = 0.0 
Epsilon = 0.0 
C =  1.0 
PERMANENT Delta = 1.0 E4 









Enter the fault types that are used in this problem. 
Fault Occurrence Models 
For all the fault occurrence models below, select the defaults for the FOM (exponential default) 
and for omega (default = 1.0). The only values to be input are fault type and lambda. 
Stage 












1.5 E 5  
1.9 E 5  
3.7 E 5  
2.7 E 6  
4.8 E-4 
(Verify the information summary against the system tree and continue to the tree entry.) 
System Fault Tree Input 
Enter System Tree Label 
SYSTEM TREE EX 7 cr 
Input Event ID Range: 1 5 
Output Gate ID Range: 6 6 cr 
Enter System Fault Tree Logic Block 
6012345a 
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Critical Pairs Fault Tree Input 
Enter Fault Tree Label 
CRITICAL PAIRS TREE EX 7 cr 
Enter Module and Logic Range ID 
- 1S918Cr 
(The inputs to the tree are numbered 1 to 8, and the outputs are numbered 9 to 18.) 
Enter Module Unit to Stage Association 
- 3 1 4 c r  
- 5 5 8 c r  
END cr 
(The inputs numbered 1 to 4 are modules from stage 3 (the computer and the 
stage) inputs numbered 5 to 8 are modules from stage 5, the bus stage.) 
Enter Logic Gate ID 
9Q23cr  
l O Q 1 3 c r  
11 Q 1 2 cr 
1 2 A 9 5 E  
13 A 10 6 cr 
1 4 A u 2 c r  
15 2 1 2  3 cr 
1 6 2 5 6 7 c r  
17 0 12 13 14 cr 
18 0 15 16 17 cr 
Enter Fault Tree Label 
-- END cr 
Output Control Options Input 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
Runtime Control Options Input 
Mission Time: 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
***MODEL INPUT COMPLETE*** 
Do you wish to review or alter this model (Y/N)? N cr 
(Store the model as EX7.DAT and exit the CARESMENU program.) 
FORTRAN STOP 
9. Example Problem 8 Description 
Example problem 8 (fig. 9.1) combines a critical pair tree model based on example problem 7 
with a system tree that incorporates stage redundancy. Since an analog computer is redundant to 
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the digital computers, a critical pair failure in the digital computers does not cause system failure. 
However, since the analog computer uses the computer bus, a critical pair failure in the bus will 
cause system failure. 
This example also includes a full singlefault model (as used before in example problem 5) and 
adds a critical pair intermittent model. Because an intermittent singlefault model is defined for 
the computer bus stage and because critically coupled faults in the bus stage cause system failure, 
the reliability assessment takes into account the effects of latent intermittents that can form critical 
pairs. Further information is given in the double-fault model and should be studied. 
In this problem C = 1.0 for all fault handling models, and therefore there are no singlepoint 









COMP I  
Figure 9.1. Example problem 8 functional block diagram. 
9.1. System Failure Criteria 
The system failure criteria for example problem 8 are as follows: 
1. The system fails if the inertial reference sensor, pitch rate sensor, actuator stage, or bus stage 
2. The system fails if a critically coupled failure occurs in the bus stage. 
3. The inertial reference sensor stage fails if two out of three modules fail. The computer stage 
fails if three out of four modules fail. The secondary actuator fails if two out of three modules fail. 
The bus stage fails if two out of three modules fail. 
fails, or if the digital computer stage fails and the analog computer or transfer switch fails. 
I 
9.2. Input Data 
For the Fault Occurrence Model: 
Inertial reference sensor modules: 
Pitch rate sensor modules: 
Digital computer modules (permanent): 
Digital computer modules (transient): 
Digital computer modules (intermittent): 
Transfer switch: 
Analog computer module: 
Secondary actuator modules: 
Bus modules (permanent): 
Bus modules (transient): 
Bus modules (intermittent): 
x = 1.5 x 
x = 1.9 x 10-~  
x = 4.8 x 
x = 7.2 x 
x = 3.3 x 
x = 2.3 x 10-9 
x = 3.7 x 1 0 - ~  
x = 6.2 x 
x = 3.7 x 10-~  
= 1.7 x lo-'' 
A = 2.7 x 
40 
For the Fault Handing Mode 
Self-test rate: 
Computer stage: 6(t’) = 360 detections per hour 
Computer bus stage: 6(t’) = 1.0 x lo4 detections per hour 
Computer stage: p(t’) = 180 errors per hour 
Computer bus stage: p( t ’ )  = 0 errors per hour 
Computer stage: E ( T )  = 3600 detections per hour 
Computer bus stage: E ( T )  = 0 detections per hour 
Computer stage: C = 1.0 
Computer bus stage: C = 1.0 
Error generation rate: 
Error detection rate: 
Error recovery probability: t 
Transient duration rate a: 
Intermittent duration rate a: 
Intermittent benign to active rate p: 
Retire module (active fault) probability PA: 
3.6 x io4 
2.1 x io3 
3.0 x lo3 
1 .o 
0 Retire module (benign error) probability PB: 
9.3. System Tree 








Figure 9.2. Example problem 8 system tree. 
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9.4. Single-Fault Model 
The general singlefault model (fig. 9.3) is intended to represent most system fault handling 
methods. For example, a system that detects faults only after errors have occurred can be modeled 
by setting 6(t’) = 0 and supplying the appropriate values for the error generation rate p(t’) and the 
error detection rate ~(7). Note that singlepoint failures are not modeled unless C < 1.0 and p(t’)  > 0. 
....................... - -  
\ 
\ 
Faulty module is 
from the system 
I permanently isolated I 
Operational, 
nonfaulted 


















Figure 9.3. Example problem 8 general single-fault model. 
9.5. Critical Pair Tree 
The critical pair tree (fig. 9.4) does not include a gate for critical pair failures in the computer 
stage because the analog computer is redundant to the digital computer stage. In other words, the 
loss of the digital computer stage, for whatever cause, does not cause system failure. The analog 
computer stage does not contribute a critical pair gate linking the C-bus to the analog computer 
since the loss of the analog computer after a loss of the digital computer stage causes system failure, 
irrespective of the bus failure. Only critical pair failures in the bus stage cause system failure. 
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-- 
Loss of system control 
because of 
module module module 
Figure 9.4. Example problem 8 critical pair tree. 
9.6. Double Intermittent Fault Model 
The double intermittent fault model (fig. 9.5) is invoked whenever critically coupled modules 
have an intermittent fault model assigned to each module. If an intermittent fault becomes benign 
(see single-fault model) and another fault occurs that is critically coupled to the benign fault (critical 
pair tree defines the linking), the double intermittent fault model is entered at state B1A2. Detection 
of the active fault takes the system to the D (detected) state where the faulty active unit is purged, 
and once again the system has only one fault-the intermittent benign. If the active fault at state 
B1A2 becomes benign, then state B1B2 is entered. From here, either of the two benign faults may 
become active, leading back to state B I A S  or state Ai&. From the B1A2/A1B2 states, one of the 
following three transitions may lead to system failure because of critical couplings: 
1. The benign fault may become active, leading to the A1A2 state. 
2 .  The active fault begins to generate errors. 
3. The active fault is detected as nonpermanent with probability (1 - PA). 
Note that the critical pair failure condition occurs only if a critical pair tree is defined and the 
singlefault model contains an intermittent fault model. 
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Figure 9.5. Example problem 8 double intermittent fault model. 









9.7. Using the User-Friendly Interface 
Stage name 
INERTIAL REF 




Stage Description Input 




















































































Fault Occurrence Models 
For all the fault occurrence models below, select the defaults for the FOM (exponential default) 






















1.5 E 5  
1.9 E 5  
4.8 E 4  
7.2 E 3  
3.3 E 4  
1.7 E10  
2.3 E 9  
3.7 E 5  
2.7 E 6  
6.2 E 4  
3.7 E 5  
45 
(Verify the information summary against the system tree and continue to the tree entry.) 
System Fault Tree Input 
Enter System Tree Label 
SYSTEM TREE EX 8 cr 
Input Event ID Range: 1 7 
Output Gate ID Range: 
Enter System Fault Tree Logic Block 
8 0 4 5 c r  
9 A 3 8 c r  
1 0 0 1 2 9 6 Z ~  
lo cr 
Critical Pairs Fault Tree Input 
Enter Fault Tree Label 
CRITICAL PAIRS TREE EX 8 cr 
Enter Module and Logic Range ID 
- 1 4 5 5 g  
- 7 1 4 G  
Enter Module Unit to Stage Association 
-- END cr 
(The modules numbered 1 to 4 are those associated with stage 7, which for this problem is the 
computer bus stage.) 
Enter Logic Gate ID 
5 2 1 2 3 .  
Enter Fault Tree Label 
-- END cr 
Output Control Options Input 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
Runtime Control Options Input 
Mission Time: lo g 
(Select defaults and verify.) 
***MODEL INPUT COMPLETE*** 
Do you wish to review or alter this model (Y/N)? N g 
~ 
(Store this model as EX8.DAT and exit the CARESMENU program.) 
FORTRAN STOP 
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10. Concluding Remarks 
The user-friendly interface is designed to make system descriptions easier to translate into 
CARE I11 input files. The series of examples shown in this demonstration and tutorial are designed 
to lead the beginning user through a progression of increasingly difficult problems. By example 
problem 8 the user should feel comfortable with the system. 
The authors have assumed that users have a basic understanding of the concepts and terms used 
in conjunction with CARE 111. Such an understanding will greatly increase the ease of using the 
CARESMENU program. 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Hampton, Virginia 23665-5225 




In the following pages are partial output listings for each of the example problems described in 
this manual. Only the input file data and unreliability summaries are included. 
As CARE 111 is modified, the visual appearance of the output may change slightly. Also, different 
computers may yield small differences in the answers. Users are encouraged to look through these 
listings and note how the system unreliabilities change as the simple problems are expanded to 
include fault handling. 






ALP= 0.0 , 
BET= 0.0 , 
DEL= 3600.0 I 
RHO= 0.0 , 
EPS= 0.0 , 
IDELF- 1 ,  
IRHOF= 1 ,  
IEPSF= 1 ,  
MARKOV= 1 ,  
PA= 1.0 , 
PB= 1.0 , 










N = 1, 1, 1, 
M = 1, 1, 1, 
NSUB= 0, 0, 0, 
MSUB= 0, 0, 0, 
LC= 0, 0, 0, 
IRLPCD=l , 







OMG( 1 , 1 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,2)= 1.0 , 






FT= 10.0000 ,ITBASE=l, 
QPTRNC= O.lOOOOOE-OI, 






Example Problem lA Output 
SYSTEM TREE EX 1 
1 3 4 4  
4 0 1 2 3  
S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M A T I O N :  














































































































































































































































































































STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 1.oooooE+o1 







AFTER EXACTLY K 
HOURS, PORTION 
FAULT HANDLING 
"I'm SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT I.OOOOOE+OI HOURS = 5.305893-03 
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$ F L ~  
NFTYPS=I, 
ALP= 0.0 , 
BET= 0.0 , 
0.0 , 
0.0 , 
1 ,  
1 ,  
1 ,  








N = 1, 1, 1, 
M = 1, 1, 1, 
NSUB= 0, 0, 0, 
MSUB= 0, 0, 0, 









OMG(1,1)= 1.1 , 
OMG ( 1,2 = 1.0 , 














Example Problem 1B Output 
SYSTEM TREE EX 1 
1 3 4 4  
4 0 1 2 3  
S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M A T I O N :  
T I M E  
( HOURS ) 
Q S U M +  
P * S U M  -------- 












































































































































































































































































K AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 1.000003+01 
STAGE HOURS, PORTION OF THE UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY: 
FA1 LURES 
FAULT HANDLING EXHAUSTION OF MODULES 
-------------- ..................... 
0 o.oOoooE+oo o.oooooE+oo 
1 o.oooooE+oo 5.016353-03 
2 O.OoooOE+oo 1.111943-06 
3 O.OOOOOE+OO 4.998893-11 












RHO= 0.0 , 
EPS= 0.0 , 
IDELF= 1 ,  
IRHOF= 1 ,  
IEPSF= 1 ,  
MARKOV= 1 ,  
PA= 1.0 , 
PB= 1.0 , 
C= 1.0 , 




Example Problem 2A Output 
I 
STGNAME(1)- 'INERTIAL REF', 
STGNAME(2)= 'PITCH RATE', 
STGNAME(3)= 'COMPUTER', 




M = 2, 2, 2, 2, 
NSUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 
M S W  0, 0, 0, 0, 
LC= 0, 0, 0, 0, 
IRLPCD=l , 









OMG( 1 , 1 )=  1.0 , 
OMG ( 1 , 2 ) = 1.0 , 
oMG( 1 , 3)s 1.0 , 
















SYSTEM TREE EXS 2 
1 4 5 5  
5 0 1 2 3 4  
S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M A T I O N :  
T I M E  




































































































































Q S U M +  














































































































































































AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 1.000003+0~ 
HOURS, PORTION OF THE UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY: 





lWI'AL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT I.OOOOOE+OI HOURS = 1.02382E-06 
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-( 1 ) = (NONE) 
NFTYPS==1 ,
ALP= 0.0 , 
BET= 0.0 , 
RHO= 0.0 , 
EPS= 0.0 , 
IDELF= 1 ,  
IRHOF= 1 ,  
IEPSF= 1 ,  
MARKOV= 1 ,  
PA= 1.0 , 
PB= 1.0 , 





STGNAME(l)= 'INERTIAL REF', 
STGNAME(2)= 'PITCH RATE', 
s-( 3 )= 'COMPUTEX' , 




M = 2, 2, 2, 2, 
NSUB= 0, 0, 44, 0, 
ACSP(3)=T , 
N = 3, 3, 4, 3, 
M S W  0, 0, 40, 0, 









OMG( 1 , 1 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,2)= 1.0 , 
oMG(1,3)= 1.0 , 
oMG(1,4)= 1.0 , 
JTYP(1,4)= 11 
RLM(1,1)= 1.5OOOOOE-O5, 








Example Problem 2B Output 
SRNTIME 







SYSTEM TREE EXS 2 
1 4 5 5  
5 0 1 2 3 4  

















































































































Q S U M +  






















































































































































































AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 1.000003+01 
HOURS, PORTION OF THE UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY: 








mrAL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT I.OOOOOE+OI HOURS = 6.411983-07 
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ALP= 0.0 ' 
BET= 0.0 , 
DEL= 3600.0 I 
RHO= 0.0 , 
EPS= 0.0 ' 
IDELF= 1 ,  
IRHOF= 1 '  
IEPSF= 1 ,  
MARKOV= 1 '  
PA= 1.0 ' 
PB= 1.0 , 
C= 1.0 , 
LGTMST=T 
SEND 
s s m s  
S"AME(1)= 'COMPUTER A', 
S"AME(2)= 'COMPUTER B', 
S"AME(3)= 'COMPUTER C', 
S"AME(5)= 'INERTIAL SENSOR A', 
S"AME(6)- 'INERTIAL SENSOR B', 
S"AME(7)= 'INERTIAL SENSOR C'' 
S"AME(8)= 'PITCH RATE', 
S"AME(g)= 'ACT ELECTRONICS A', 
STCNAME(lo)= 'ACT ELECTRONICS B', 
S"AME(ll)= 'ACT ELECTRONICS C' 




N = 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 
M = 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 
NSUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
MSUB= 0, 0' 0, 0, 0, 0, 0' 0' 0, 0, 0, 


















Example Problem 3 Output 
OMG( 1,1) = 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,2 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG ( 1,3 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,4 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,5 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,6 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,7 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG(1,8)= 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,9)= 1.0 , 
OMG(1,10)= 1.0 , 





















SYSTEM TREE Ex 3 
1 11 12 24 
12 0 1 5  
13 0 2 6  
14 0 3 7  
15 0 4 8  
16 3 12 13 14 15 
17 3 1 2 3 4  
18 0 1 9  
19 0 2 10 
20 0 3 11 
21 3 1 2 3 4  
22 0 16 17 
23 3 18 19 20 21 
24 0 22 23 
62 
Example Problem 3 Output 









































T I M E  










































































































































































































































STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 1.000003+01 
OF THE UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY: 









SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT I.OOOOOE+O1 HOURS = 2.914233-07 







ALP= 0.0 , 0.0 , 
BE- 0.0 , 0.0 , 
DEL= 3600.0 , 360.0 , 
RHO= 0.0 , 180.0 , 
EPS= 0.0 , 3600.0 , 
IDELF= 1 ,  1 I 
IRHOF= 1 ,  1 I 
IEPSF= 1 ,  1 , 
MARKOV= 1 ,  
PA= 1.0 , 1.0 , 
PB= 1.0 , 0.0 , 




STGNAME(l)= 'INERTIAL REF', 
STGNAME( 2)=  'PITCH RATE', 
STGNAME(3)= 'COMPUTER', 




N = 3, 3, 4, 3, 
M = 2, 2, 2, 2, 
NSUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 
MSUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 










OMG( 1 , 1 )= 1.0 , 
OMG(1,2)= 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,3)= 1.0 , 














SYSTEM TREE EX 4A 
1 4 5 5  
5 0 1 2 3 4  
S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M A T I O N :  
T I M E  
( HOURS ) 
Q S U M +  













1 3  
1 4  



















































































































































































































3.242323-07 1.582853-09 3.258153-07 
3.492783-07 1.840963-09 3.511193-07 
3.743233-07 2.119333-09 3.764423-07 
4.244113-07 2.737553-09 4.271493-07 
4.744983-07 3.438793-09 4.779373-07 
5.245833-07 4.224333-09 5.288073-07 
5.746663-07 5.095433-09 5.797623-07 
6.247473-07 6.053383-09 6.308013-07 
6.748273-07 7.099453-09 6.819263-07 
7.249043-07 8.234913-09 7.331393-07 
7.749803-07 9.461043-09 7.844413-07 
8.751253-07 1.219043-08 8.873153-07 
9.752633-07 1.529773-08 . 9.905603-07 
1.075393-06 1.879313-08 1.094193-06 
1.175523-06 2.268683-08 1.198203-06 
1.275633-06 2.698893-08 1.302623-06 
1.375743-06 3.170933-08 1.407453-06 
1.475843-06 3.685883-08 1.512703-06 
1.575933-06 4.244743-08 1.618383-06 
1.776093-06 5.498083-08 1.831073-06 
1.976223-06 6.939173-08 2.045613-06 
2.176323-06 8.576133-08 2.262083-06 
2.376393-06 1.041683-07 2.480563-06 
2.576433-06 1.246963-07 2.701133-06 
2.776443-06 1.474213-07 2.923863-06 
2.976423-06 1.724283-07 3.148853-06 
3.176373-06 1.997973-07 3.376173-06 
3.576183-06 2.619333-07 3.838113-06 
3.975863-06 3.344703-07 4.310333-06 
4.375423-06 4.180513-07 4.793473-06 
4.774863-06 5.133153-07 5.288173-06 
5.174173-06 6.208893-07 5.795063-06 
5.57337E-06 7.414043-07 6.314773-06 
5.972433-06 8.755033-07 6.847943-06 
6.371383-06 1.023823-06 7.395203-06 
AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 1.000003+01 






TOTAL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT I.OOOOOE+OI HOURS = 7.395203-06 
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0.0 , 0.0 , 
0.0 , 0.0 1 
0.0 , 3 0.0 I 
0.0 , 180.0 , 
0.0 , 3600.0 , 
1 ,  2 I 
1 ,  2 I 
1 ,  2 I 
2 ,  
1.0 , 1.0 1 
1.0 1 0.0 , 
1.0 , 9.99ooooE-01, 




STGNAME(l)= 'INERTIAL REF', 
STGNAME(2)= 'PITCH RATE', 





N = 3, 3, 4, 3, 
M = 2, 2, 2, 2, 
NSUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 
MSUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 










OMG( 1 , 1 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG( 1 , 2 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG( 1 , 3 )= 1.0 , 
OMG( 1'4 ) = 1.0 , 






FT= 10.0000 ,ITBASE=1, 
PSTRNC= O.lOOOOOE-O9, 
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SYSTEM TREE EX 4A 
1 4 5 5  
5 0 1 2 3 4  































T I M E  
































































P * S U M  
Q S U M +  














































































































































































































































. .  K 
STAGE 
FA1 LURES 
AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 
HOURS, PORTION OF THE UNRELIABILITY 





TOTAL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT I.OOOOOE+O1 HOURS = 6.784643-06 
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I 
Example Problem 5 Output 
SFHMNAMES 
F"AME( 1)= '("E)' , 
FHMNAME(2)= 'PERMANENT', 
F"AME( 4)= 'INTERMITTENT' 




ALP= 0.0 , 0.0 , 36000.0 , 2100.0 , 
BET= 0.0 , 0.0 , 0.0 , 3000.0 , 
DEL= 3600.0 , 360.0 , 360.0 I 360.0 I 
RHO= 0.0 , 180.0 , 180.0 , 180.0 , 
EPS= 0.0 , 3600.0 , 3600.0 , 3600.0 , 
IDELF= 1 ,  1 I 1 I 1 I 
IRHOF= 1 ,  1 I 1 I 1 I 
I EPSF= 1 ,  1 I 1 I 1 I 
MARKOV= 1 ,  
PA= 1.0 , 1.0 , 1.0 , 0.9 , 
PB= 1.0 , 0.0 , 0.0 , 0.1 , 
C= 1.0 I 9.99OOOOE-OI., 9.99OOOOE-O1, 9.99OOOOE-O1, 
XTMST-T 
SEND 
$ S " A M E S  
STcNAME(l)= 'INERTIAL REF', 
S"AME(2)= 'PITCH RATE', 
S " A M E (  4)- 'SWITCH' I 
STGNAME(5)= 'ANALOG COMPUTER' I 
S"AME(3)= 'DIGITAL COMPUTER', 




M = 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 
NSUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
N = 3, 3, 4, 1, 1, 3, 
MSUB- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 











OMG( 1 , 1 )= 1.0 , 
OMG(1,2)= 1.0 , 
OMG( 1 , 3)= 1.0 , 1.0 , 
OMG ( 1,4 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG ( 1 , 5 = 1.0 , 





Example Problem 5 Output 
RLM(1,2)= 1.9OOOOOE-05, 













SYSTEM TREE EX 5 
1 6 7 9  
7 0 4 5  
8 A 3 7  
9 0 1 2 8 6  











































































































































































































































































































































Example Problem 5 Output 
K AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 1.OOOOOE+O1 
STAGE HOURS, PORTION OF THE UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY: 
FAILURES 
FAULT HANDLING EXHAUSTION OF MODULES ------------- ..................... 
0 1.274793-05 o.oooooE+oo 
1 8.91028E-10 5.861943-07 
2 X 1.73487E-12 
3 X 1.193653-19 
TOTAL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT l.OOOOOE+Ol HOURS = 1.33350E-05 
74 







ALP= 0.0 , 0.0 , 
BET= 0.0 , 0.0 , 
DEL= 3600.0 I 360.0 I 
RHO= 0.0 , 180.0 I 
EPS= 0.0 , 3600.0 , 
IDELF= 1 ,  1 I 
IRHOF= 1 ,  1 I 
IEPSF= 1 ,  1 I 
MARKOV= 1 ,  
PA= 1.0 , 1.0 , 
PB= 1.0 , 0.0 , 




STGNAME(1)= 'INERTIAL REF', 
STGNAME(2)= 'PTICH RATE', 
STGNAME(3)z 'COMPUTER', 




N = 3 ,  3, 4, 3 ,  
M = 2, 2, 2, 2, 
NSUB- 0, 0, 0, 0, 
MSUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 











OMG( 1 , 1 )= 1.0 , 
OMG(1,2)= 1.0 , 
OMG(1,3)= 1.0 , 







FT= 10.0000 ,ITBASE=l, 
PSTRNC= O.1OOOOOE-O9, 
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SYSTEM TREE EX 6 
1 4 5 5  
5 0 1 2 3 4  
CRITICAL PAIRS TREE EX 6 
1 4 5 5  
3 1 4  
5 2 1 2 3  
S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M A T I O N :  
T I M E  















































































































Q S U M +  






























































































































































































































Example Problem 6 Output 
K AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 1.oOooOE+O1 
STAGE HOURS, PORTION OF THE UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY: 
FAILURES 
FAULT HANDLING EXHAUSTION OF MODULES 
-------------- ..................... 
0 6.398073-06 o.oooooE+Oo 
1 X 1.02382E-06 
2 X 3.35975E-13 
3 X 1.944683-20 
TOTAL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT 1.OOOOOE+O1 HOURS = 7.421893-06 
78 
Example Problem 7 Output 
$F"AMES 
F"AME(l)= '(NONE)', 
F"AME(2)= 'PERMANENT C' , 




ALP= 0.0 , 0.0 , 0.0 , 
BET= 0.0 , 0.0 , 0.0 , 
RHOr 0.0 , 180.0 , 0.0 , 
EPS= 0.0 , 3600.0 , 0.0 , 
IDELF= 1 ,  1 f 1 I 
IRHOF= 1 ,  1 f 1 I 
IEPSF= 1 ,  1 I 1 f 
MARKOV- 1 ,  
PA= 1.0 , 1.0 , 1.0 , 
PB= 1.0 , 0.0 , 0.0 , 
C= 1.0 , 9.99OOOOE-01, 1.0 , 




STGNAME(l)= 'INERTIAL REF', 
STGNAI.1E(2)= 'PITCH RATE', 
STGNAI.1E(4)= 'SECONDARY ACT', 





M = 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 
NSUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
N = 3, 3 ,  4' 3, 4, 
MUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
LC= 0, 0' 0, 0, 0, 
NOP( 1 , 3)=3 , 











OMG(1,1)= 1.0 , 
OMG( 1 , 2 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG(1,3)= 1.0 , 
OMG( 1 , 4 )= 1.0 , 
ONG( 1 , 5)s 1.0 , 
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SYSTEM TREE EX 7 
1 5 6 6  
6 0 1 2 3 4 5  
CRITICAL PAIRS TREE EX 7 
1 8 9 1 8  
3 1 4  
5 5 8  
9 0 2 3  
10 0 1 3  
11 0 1 2  
12 A 9 5  
13 A 10 6 
14 A 11 7 
15 2 1 2 3  
16 2 5 6 7  
17 0 12 13 14 
18 0 15 16 17 
S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M A T I O N :  
1 0.000003+00 0.000003+00 
2 4.901963-03 1.807613-09 
3 9.803923-03 4.881573-09 
4 1.470593-02 7.994503-09 
5 1.960783-02 1.112393-08 
6 2.450983-02 1.425473-08 
7 2.941183-02 1.738593-08 
8 3.431373-02 2.051733-08 
9 3.921573-02 2.364883-08 
10 4.901963-02 2.991163-08 











Q S U M +  
















































































































































































































































Example Problem 7 Output 
2.976423-06 1.724283-07 3.148853-06 
3.176373-06 1.997973-07 3.376173-06 
3.576183-06 2.6193333-07 3,838113-06 
3.975863-06 3.344703-07 4.310333-06 




























4.774863-06 5.133153-07 5.288173-06 
5.174173-06 6.208893-07 5.795063-06 
5.573373-06 7.414043-07 6.314773-06 
5.972433-06 8.755033-07 6.847943-06 
6.371383-06 1.023823-06 7.395203-06 
AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 1.000003+01 
HOURS, PORTION OF THE UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY: 





TOTAL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT I.OOOOOE+OI HOURS = 7.395203-06 
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Example Problem 8 Output 
SFHMNAMES 
F"AME(1)= '(NONE)', 
FHMNAME(2)= 'PERMANENT C', 
FHMNAME( 4)= 'TRANSIENT' , 
F"AME( 5)= 'INTERMITTENT' 




ALP= 0.0 , 0.0 , 0.0 , 
BET= 0.0 , 0.0 , 0.0 , 
RHO= 0.0 , 180.0 , 0.0 , 
EPS= 0.0 , 3600.0 , 0.0 , 
IDELF= 1 ,  1 I 1 I 
IRHOF= 1 ,  1 I 1 I 
I EPSF= 1 ,  1 I 1 I 
MARKOV= 1 ,  
PA= 1.0 , 1.0 , 1.0 , 
PB= 1.0 , 0.0 , 0.0 , 
C= 1.0 , 1.0 , 1.0 , 




STGNAME(l)= 'INERTIAL REF', 
S " A M E (  2)= 'PITCH RATE', 
STGNAME(3)= 'DIGITAL COMPUTER', 
STGNAME( 4 ) =  'SWITCH' I 
STcdwME(5)= 'ANALOG COMPUTER', 
STGNAME(6)= 'SECONDARY ACTUATOR', 
STGNAME(7)= 'COMPUTER BUS' 
S m  
$STAGES 
NSTGES=7 , 
N = 3, 3, 4, 1, 1, 3, 4 ,  
M = 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 
NSUB- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
MSUB= 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 













JTYP(1,7)= 3, 4, 5, 
OMG(1,1)= 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,2 ) = 1.0 , 

















1 ,  
1 ,  





Example Problem 8 Output 
OMG( 1,4)= 1.0 , 
OMG ( 1,5 ) = 1.0 , 
OMG(1,6)= 1.0 , 
OMG( 1,7)= 1.0 , 1.0 , 1.0 , 
RLM(1,1)= 1.5000003-05, 
RLM(1,2)= 1.9000003-05, 




RLM(1,7)= 2.7000003-06, 6.2000003-04, 3.7000003-05 
SEND 
SRNTIME 







SYSTEM TREE EX 8 
1 7 8 1 0  
8 0 4 5  
9 A 3 8  
10 0 1 2 9 6 7  
CRITICAL PAIRS TREE EX 8 
1 4 5 5  
7 1 4  
5 2 1 2 3  
S U M M A R Y  I N F O R M A T I O N :  
T I M E  






















































Q S U M +  




























































































































































































































































Example Problem 8 Output 
61 7.490203+00 1.263433-09 3.290783-07 3.303423-07 
62 8.11765E+OO 1.369323-09 3.865253-07 3.878943-07 
63 8.745103+00 1.475223-09 4.485903-07 4.500663-07 
64 9.372553+00 1.581123-09 5.152763-07 5.168573-07 
65 1.00000E+01 1.687023-09 5.865813-07 5.882683-07 
K AFTER EXACTLY K STAGES HAVE FAILED BY 1.oooooE+o1 
STAGE HOURS, PORTION OF THE UNRELIABILITY CAUSED BY: 
FA1 LURES 
FAULT HANDLING EXHAUSTION OF MODULES 
-------------- ..................... 
0 1.687023-09 o.OoooOE+oo 
1 X 5.86579E-07 
2 X 1.7361713-12 
3 X 1.19367E-19 
TOTAL SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY AT 1.OOOOOE+O1 HOURS = 5.88268E-07 
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Appendix B 
CARE I11 Variables 
The user-friendly interface creates the input file to be used when running CARE 111. The input 
file could be created manually with an editor, but typically this results in syntactically incorrect 
CARE I11 input files. Also, some CARE I11 variable names are cryptic, and the actual parameters 
or values they represent are not easily interpreted. 
Though the entire creation of the input file by hand is not recommended, there are times when 
editing a file already created by the UFI may be necessary. Therefore, a description of each of the 
variables found in the CARE I11 input files is given. Included parenthetically with most descriptions 
are the CAREBMENU screen (in uppercase letters) and line (in boldface letters) from which the 
data values are obtained. The variables that the typical user will most likely be altering in an editing 
session have been marked with double asterisks. For a more thorough description of the variables, 












This flag indicates the choice of “logarithmic” (nonlinear) time steps 
(LGTMST = T) or linear time steps (LGTMST = F). (RUNTIME CON- 
TROL OPTIONS INPUT: Integration steps (17 <= NSTEPS <= 64, or 
“Logarithmic”) :) 
This variable indicates the total number of fault handling models defined 
for the model. For example, in example problem 7, three fault types are 
described: (NONE), PERMANENT B, and PERMANENT C. 
These are the values for a entered for each fault handling model. With this 
and all other fault handling model parameters, the first value in the line is 
associated with the first FHM entered, the second value is associated with the 
second FHM entered, etc. (FAULT HANDLING MODELS: Alpha) 
This variable indicates the p values for each of the fault handling models. 
Note that though all /3 values may be identical, each value is represented. 
(FAULT HANDLING MODELS: Beta) 
The 6(t’) values for each of the fault handling models are included in this 
line. (FAULT HANDLING MODELS: Delta) 
RHO enumerates the p(t’) values for each of the fault handling models. 
(FAULT HANDLING MODELS: Rho) 
This variable indicates E ( T )  values for each of the fault handling models. 
(FAULT HANDLING MODELS: Epsilon) 
The user can choose either the uniform or exponential distribution to de- 
scribe S(t’). If the exponential distribution is chosen, IDELF = l. If the uni- 
form distribution is chosen, IDELF = 2. (FAULT HANDLING MODELS: 
Delta FHM) 
This flag indicates the distribution chosen to describe p(t’).  As in IDELF 
above, IRHOF = 1 indicates the exponential rate function and IRHOF = 2 
indicates the uniform rate function. (FAULT HANDLING MODELS: Rho 
FHM) 
This flag indicates the distribution chosen to describe ~(7). IEPSF = 1 indi- 
cates that the exponential distribution is chosen, and IEPSF = 2 indicates 
that the uniform distribution is chosen. (FAULT HANDLING MODELS: 
Epsilon FHM) 
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MARKOV Typically, this variable is set equal to one. If all distributions for 6(t’), p(t’),  
and E ( T )  are exponential, MARKOV = 1 acts as a flag to CARE I11 and a 
very efficient homogeneous Markov solution technique is used to solve the 
problem. If any or all of the distributions are uniform, CARESMENU sets 
MARKOV = 2, and a nonhomogeneous Markov solver is used to find the 
solution. A more in-depth discussion can be found in the CARE I11 User’s 
Guide (ref. 2). 
**PA This indicates the value of PA for each of the fault handling models. (FAULT 
HANDLING MODELS: Pa) 
**PB This variable indicates the value of PB for each of the fault handling models. 
(FAULT HANDLING MODELS: Pb) 
**C This variable indicates the value of C for each of the fault handling models. 
(FAULT HANDLING MODELS: C) 
See figure 6.3 for the pictorial representation of the parameters ALP, BET, DEL, RHO, EPS, 
PA, PB, and C. 
CVPRNT CVPRNT is a flag for outputting moments of the single- and double-fault 
handling functions. The data generated by CVPRNT = T are used by the 
program developers and are not normally of interest to the reliability analyst. 
CVPLOT This variable is a flag for plots of the single- and double-fault handling 
functions. For interested users, a detailed description of this variable can 
be found in the CARE I11 User’s Guide (ref. 2). (OUTPUT CONTROL 
OPTIONS INPUT: Coverage Functions Plot (T or F)) 
IAXSCV This parameter describes the Y-axis scale to be used when the functions 
described in CVPLOT are plotted. (OUTPUT CONTROL OPTIONS 
INPUT: Coverage Y-Axis Selection ...) 
STA GES Paragraph 
**NSTGES Indicates the total number of stages defined in the model. 
**N These values represent the number of modules in each stage. In example 
problem 7, stages 1, 2, and 4 each have three modules, and stages 3 and 5 
each have four modules. (STAGE DESCRIPTION INPUT: Number of 




These numbers indicate the minimum number of modules needed for stage 
function. (STAGE DESCRIPTION INPUT: Minimum Number of Mod- 
ules for Stage Operation) 
The values for this variable indicate the number of redundant submodules 
there are for each of the modules in the stage. For a module with no internal 
redundancy, NSUB = 0. (STAGE DESCRIPTION INPUT: Number of 
Beginning Submodules per Module) 
These numbers represent the minimum number of submodules needed per 
module (in the corresponding stage) for module operation. (STAGE D E  









The variable name stands for active spares? If ACSP = T, all NSUB sub- 
modules are active (including the NSUB-MSUB “spares”) and can fail at the 
rate given by RLMSUB. If ACSP = F, only MSUB submodules are active 
and subject to failure. As active submodules fail at rate RLMSUB, they are 
replaced from the NSUB-MSUB spare pool until less than MSUB submodules 
are nonfailed. At that point, the module falls below minimum operational 
requirements and is considered failed. (STAGE DESCRIPTION INPUT: 
Spare Submodules On-Line (T/F)) 
The LC variable affects the CARE I11 “QSUM” output value by inhibiting 
the computation of some critical pair failure paths. (STAGE DESCRIPTION 
INPUT: Critical Fault Threshold) 
The NOP value specifies which modules are in use and which are spares. It 
also specifies which modules are subject to critical pair failures. If no NOP 
values are indicated in the input file, CARE I11 assumes that all modules are 
in use. The CARE I11 User’s Guide (ref. 2) provides an in-depth discussion of 
the NOP parameter. (STAGE DESCRIPTION INPUT: Set(s) of Modules 
Subject to Critical Pair Failures) 
This variable specifies the option chosen for output printout. The IRLPCD 
values and their associated output are as follows: 
1-summary results only 
2--P(tll), probability of successful operation plus summary results 
3--Q(tlZ), probability of a fault handling failure (singlepoint 
4-all the above 
or critical pair failure) plus summary results 
The user is cautioned about selecting options 2 to 4 when a large system is 
being modeled. The amount of output can be large. (OUTPUT CONTROL 
OPTIONS INPUT: Output Option (1-4)) 
This is a flag specifying if summary information QSUM, P*SUM, and QSUM 
+ P*SUM is to be plotted against time. (OUTPUT CONTROL OPTIONS 
INPUT: Reliability Functions Plot (T or F)) 
This parameter describes the Y-axis scale to be used when the summary 
information described in RLPLOT is plotted. (OUTPUT CONTROL 
OPTIONS INPUT: Reliability Y-Axis Selection.. .) 
FLTCAT Paragraph 
**NFCATS This variable indicates the number of fault handling models associated with 
each stage. 
JTYP associates the appropriate fault handling model(s) with the stages. 
In general, JTYP (i, z) = F indicates that the fault type associated with 
stage z is F .  Note that because each stage can have up to five different fault 
handling models associated with it, the variable i has a range of one to five. 
(FAULT OCCURRENCE MODELS: Fault Type) 
This is shape parameter omega (w)  of the Weibull fault occurrence rate 
Aw(Xt)w-l. OMG ( i , z )  = w states that the ith fault type associated with 
stage z has an omega value equal to w. (FAULT OCCURRENCE MODELS: 
Omega) 
RLM is the parameter lambda (A) of the Weibull fault occurrence rate. 
RLM (i, z) = L states that the ith fault type associated with stage z has a 








JSBTYP associates the appropriate fault handling model(s) with the redun- 
dant submodules in a stage. For a stage with internal redundancy, JSBTYP 
must always associate a permanent fault type (a = 0) to the redundant por- 
tion of the module. Note that for stage z, with internally redundant modules, 
the original fault type parameter JTYP defines the fault type(s) for stage z 
that affect either the nonredundant portion of the module or the redundant 
portion when no redundant submodules remain. (FAULT OCCURRENCE 
MODELS-second column: Fault Type) 
For a stage with internal redundancy, OMGSUB represents the omega (w) 
parameter of the Weibull fault occurrence rate Aw(At)w-l for the redundant 
portion of the modules. Note that for stage z, with internally redundant 
modules, the original w parameter OMG characterizes the failure rate of ei- 
ther the nonredundant portion of the module or the redundant portion when 
no redundant submodules remain. (FAULT OCCURRENCE MODELS- 
second column: Omega) 
For a stage with internal redundancy, RLMSUB represents the lambda (A) 
parameter of the Weibull fault occurrence rate for the redundant portion 
of the modules. Note that for stage z, with internally redundant modules, 
the original A parameter RLM characterizes the failure rate of either the 
nonredundant portion of the module or the redundant portion when no 










This variable indicates flight time. (RUNTIME CONTROL OPTIONS 
INPUT: Mission Time) 
ITBASE specifies the time base used for the system operating time. Shown 
below are the five user choices for the mission time base and the correspond- 






(RUNTIME CONTROL OPTIONS INPUT: Timebase ...) 
This is a flag used by CARE I11 to indicate whether or not a system tree is 
included in the input file. SYSFLG = T indicates that a system tree is to 
follow, and SYSFLG = F indicates that no tree follows. 
This flag indicates whether or not the input file contains a critical pair tree. 
CPLFLG = T indicates the presence of a critical pair tree; CPLFLG = F 
indicates no critical pair tree is to follow. 
For most users, the default value of PSTRNC (PSTAR TRUNCATOR) 
is adequate. This parameter is used to limit the number of terms used in 
computing the fault handling unreliability QSUM. (RUNTIME CONTROL 
OPTIONS INPUT: Cut Truncation Value) 
As in PSTRNC, QPTRNC is usually set equal to its default. As a control 
parameter, it limits the number of terms used to compute the fault handling 
unreliability QSUM. (RUNTIME CONTROL OPTIONS INPUT: QPTRNC 
Value) 
**NPSBRN This parameter determines the maximum number of stages placed in each 
subrun (number per subrun). The User’s Guide (ref. 2) provides some insight 
into the varying of this parameter. (RUNTIME CONTROL OPTIONS 
INPUT: NPSBRN Value) 
This flag indicates that the CARE III program is to check the input file val- 
ues before computing system unreliability. CKDATA = T indicates “check 
the data,” and CKDATA = F indicates “don’t check the data.” The vari- 
able is typically set equal to T (true). (RUNTIME CONTROL OPTIONS 
INPUT: CKDATA (T or F)) 
CKDATA 
The Tree Paragraphs 
These paragraphs are exactly the CARE3MENU inputs minus the “END” inputs which indicate 
the end of inputs for the CARESMENU program. The first line corresponds to the System Tree 
Label input; the next line is the range to the CARE3MENU request for the Input Event ID 
Range, Output Gate ID Range; and the next line(s) are the System Tree Logic Block. 
The last lines of the input file are the critical pair tree description, if a critical pair tree exists 
for the problem. The first line of the Critical Pairs Fault Tree Input section is the Fault Tree 
Label, followed by the Module and Logic Range ID line. The next line(s) indicate the Module 
Unit to Stage Association, and the last line(s) describe the critical pair tree Logic Gate ID. For 
input files with no critical pair tree(s), the last lines of the input file are the system tree paragraph.’ 
Most input file lines are written in an abbreviated format. For example, the line describing the 
number of beginning modules in each stage for example problem 7 reads N = 3, 3, 4, 3, 4, but 
could have been written N(l) = 3, N(2) = 3, N(3) = 4, N(4) = 3, N(5) = 4, which is the 
form shown in the User’s Guide (ref. 2). The forms are equivalent and either form is correct. 
Notice that data are separated by commas. This is very important. The spacing shown, however, 
is simply a function of the FORTRAN FORMAT statements used by the CARESMENU to write 
the input file and does not need to be observed when editing input files. The file is written entirely 
in uppercase letters, and when editing the file, use uppercase letters. 
Be especially careful when adding or deleting stages, fault handling models, or fault occurrence 
models. Several variables may need to be changed. For example, if a transient fault were added to 
an input file and attached to stage 1, at least 13 variables would need to be changed. (The obvious 
changes would be to ALP, BET, DEL, RHO, EPS, IDELF, IRHOF, IEPSF, PA, PB, and C. But 
what about the number of fault types (NFTYPS)? It would need to be changed (incremented by 
one). JTYP(1,l) would also have to be altered to reflect the new fault type associated with stage 1, 
and OMG and RLM may also need to be changed.) Major changes would typically be performed by 
ALTERING a file with the CARESMENU program. 
CARE I11 does not require a system tree block in the input file. In the case of no user-specified system tree, 
a “default” tree is assumed. This default tree consists of one OR gate with all stagea as input and implies that a 
failure in any stage will cause system failure. To specify the default system tree while using CARE3MENU, simply 
type DEFAULT when the system requests Enter System Tree Label. 
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Appendix C 
Executing CARE I11 Using a VAX/VMS System 
i Typically, the user-friendly interface files are in a directory separate from the CARE I11 files. It is 
most advantageous to be in the CARE I11 directory when executing the program. RUNCARE.COM 
is the VMS operating system command file which executes the three CARE I11 modules and combines 
their outputs into one output file entitled <filename>.OUT. Directions for executing CARE I11 are 
provided as comment statements in the RUNCARE.COM file and can be read by printing or copying 
the file to the screen. 
Once again, user input is underlined and characters that are not underlined indicate useful 
information from the instructor. The steps necessary to execute CARE I11 are as follows: 
Step 1-Get to the CARE I11 directory; type SET DEFAULT <directorv>. 
Step 2-Copy the input file from the CARE3MENU directory to the CARE I11 directory; 
type COPY [< directory >] < filename.ext > *. (The asterisk indicates that the copy 
destination is the default. If the user is in the CARE I11 directory, that is the default.) 
For example, type COPY[< root directory > . CUFI] EXl.DAT*. 
Step 3-Execute CARE 111; type @R-. For example, to execute 
CARE I11 with the input file entitled EXl.DAT, type @RUNCARE EX1.DAT. 
Step 4-CARE I11 will usually take between 20 seconds and 4 or 5 minutes to execute. 
During this time many system error statements may be printed to the screen 
and can be ignored. When the dollar sign prompt reappears, the command 
file has finished executing CARE I11 and the output file <filename>.OUT 
has been created. 
Directions for executing CARE I11 on other systems (such as the UNIX operating system or 
CYBER NOS operating system) are not included. The CARE3MENU was developed on the Digital 
Equipment Corporation VAX computer with the VMS operating system and uses several routines 
from the VMS Runtime Library and the VMS System Services. It is therefore assumed that users 
who are reading this manual and using the CARESMENU have a VAX/VMS system. 
To execute the CARE3MENU program, simply type QCARE3MENU after setting the directory 
default to the appropriate directory. The input file created by CARE3MENU, unless otherwise 
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